Quotessence
Home / Quotes / Quote by Antoine Lavoisier

Quote by Antoine Lavoisier

“About eight days ago I discovered that sulfur in burning, far from losing weight, on the contrary, gains it; it is the same with phosphorus; this increase of weight arises from a prodigious quantity of air that is fixed during combustion and combines with the vapors. This discovery, which I have established by experiments, that I regard as decisive, has led me to think that what is observed in the combustion of sulfur and phosphorus may well take place in the case of all substances that gain in weight by combustion and calcination; and I am persuaded that the increase in weight of metallic calyxes is due to the same cause... This discovery seems to me one of the most interesting that has been made since Stahl and since it is difficult not to disclose something inadvertently in conversation with friends that could lead to the truth I have thought it necessary to make the present deposit to the Secretary of the Academy to await the time I make my experiments public.”

Quote by Antoine Lavoisier

Author

Antoine Lavoisier
Antoine Lavoisier

Antoine Lavoisier (August 26, 1743 – May 8, 1794) was a French chemist, widely regarded as the father of modern chemistry. He disproved the phlogiston theory through quantitative experiments, identified the role of oxygen in combustion, and named oxygen and hydrogen. Lavoisier also reformed chemical nomenclature, making chemical language systematic. His book 'Elements of Chemistry' laid the foundation of modern chemistry. However, during the French Revolution, he was executed by guillotine due to his former role as a tax collector. more

You May Also Like

“I saw an exhibition of paintings of alchemists once,’ said Ruth. ‘It used to be a popular setpiece. There was one I liked by Joseph Wright of Derby―of an alchemist who’d accidentally discovered phosphorus. He’s just crouching there, staring in amazement at his test tube or alembic, or whatever you call it. A bloody good painting, actually.”

“In Frege’s conception of logic, a logical law states an absolutely general truth—one whose truth every rational being must, on pain of contradiction, acknowledge. In later Wittgenstein’s practice, a grammatical remark inherits an aspect of Frege’s conception of the logical. On a proper understanding of a grammatical remark, it articulates a truism— something that admits of no contrary—hence something that every speaker of the language must acknowledge. Or conversely, if there is something in a given candidate grammatical remark that proves to admit of disagreement, then the remark in question cannot serve its methodological role. It fails to bring into view a point of (what later Wittgenstein calls) grammar. Grammatical remarks acquire their point—that is, our need for such reminders derives—from our attempting but failing to achieve a proper reflective understanding of our way around our own language. If the grammatical remark serves its purpose, what is thereby acknowledged is something that can come into view only against the background of a prior failed attempt to achieve a perspicuous overview of our own concepts. A Wittgensteinian grammatical remark comes to life as such only against the background of a philosophical confusion. Logic or grammar for later Wittgenstein, pace Frege, could qualify as a science only if philosophy is one. This also means that, for later Wittgenstein, unlike for Frege, there is no preexisting stock of propositions that constitutes all of the logico-grammatical truths there are. In potentiality there are perhaps indefinitely many, but in actuality the only remarks that actually exercise the power to disclose a philosophico-grammatical truth, for later Wittgenstein, are those that allow us to make progress with the problems that actually vex us in philosophy.”

“We savour on great memories of happy times.”