“Lordship and the (re-)construction of affinities:
A lord’s familia (his aggregate dependents) has been likened to a series of concentric circles, with the lord at the centre, and inner, middle, and outer circles... This description of concentric circles is merely illustrative since members of an affinity often overlapped between these categories, and the rings in themselves obviously lacked clear boundaries which makes the definitive assigning of individuals to such groupings difficult (p. 78).
…though it seems a reasonable assumption to base strength of attachment on frequency of involvement, it is impossible to tell whether one client was less strongly attached than another; thus, irrespective of frequency, all clients require consideration… As a result of these uncertainties and limitations, the reconstruction of affinities is something of an imprecise art. Connection construction is not a simple task; the difficulties, and awareness of the subtleties, mean that there are few, if any, certainties regarding clients, so it is necessary to speak of only possibilities, probabilities, and likelihoods (p. 83).
…This continuity of connections indicates how alignments continually changed and altered, were recreated and reshaped. While the politics and alignments of one decade or series of several years might appear evanescent, in reality, beneath the tumultuous surface of the manoeuvrings of local politics, affinities proved to be a durable foundation. Thus, perhaps, we should refer not so much to great-magnate-commanded affinities as to leading-gentry-led affiliations (p. 350).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“Defining landed, administrative, and political elites:
Perhaps the essential element in the definition of whom to include is a matter of allowing the individuals to select themselves for analysis through their frequent involvement in local political structures (p. 103).
…the greatest gentry landowners comprised the elite of landed society–the pool from which participants in administrative society were recruited. Those who held the most county offices were the most important and influential–comprising the elite of administrative society. Although there will have been exceptions, in general, the greatest gentry landowners also held the most shire posts, so landed and administrative elites were almost synonymous. The political elite would therefore be virtually the same as the administrative elite (p. 106).
…the ‘political elite’ was in total 347 individuals (82 peers; 265 gentry). There were a number of individuals who served in all the region’s counties therefore comprising what could be termed a ‘regional elite’: these totalled 35 individuals (14 peers; 21 gentry). (pp. 106–7) …in reality, ‘regional’ figures common to all counties were few in number, and were mostly peers (pp. 107–8).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“The selection of case studies:
Were families’ affiliations confined within shire boundaries or did they extend across the south-west? How did the gentry relate to their patrons–did clients transcend county boundaries when engaged on business with their patron? These questions will be answered by means of three detailed case studies: those of the Lords Hungerford, and the gentry families, Arundell of Lanherne (Cor.), and Edgcumbe of Cotehele (Cor.). These families have been specifically identified for a number of reasons–firstly, because successive heads of these families were frequently involved in county government and were important figures in their respective shires; and secondly, because of the well-preserved nature of their archives (p. 119).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“County, two-county (meso-regional), and broader regional elites and identities:
…the greater gentry were in a better position to form an identity that was regional in nature than the lesser gentry because of the broader nature of their landed, marital, and personal interests; in addition, they were also the individuals who would be recruited by magnates for the influence that they could wield over their clients. It appears possible to speak of ‘county elites’: the shires seem to have been the primary foci for identification … The ‘regional elite’–comprising those involved in all counties–was small in number, being composed mostly of peers and greater gentry. While there was a significant supra-shire dimension to elites’ landholding, office-holding, and marriages, this seems to have been focused on meso-scale regions–the coupled-county units of Somerset/Dorset, and Devon/Cornwall. (p. 147)
…With the principal foci appearing to be at shire and meso-regional levels, the concept of a broader south-west regional identity seems somewhat problematic. However, that said, the trans-county and trans-regional nature of the Hungerford affinity–with many of the same clients utilised in transactions concerning different shires–shows how a magnate and his circle could provide a focus for patronage that was extra-county, perhaps even regional, in scope (p.148).
The principal themes of this study have been the interplay of the contemporaneous politics of the south-western elites, and long-term shire and regional identities (p. 347). …The ‘regional elite’, as seen, appears to have consisted mostly of only a small number of peers and the greatest gentry who cannot be regarded as a purely ‘regional’ elite because of their possession of wide-ranging estates on a trans-regional or national scale. The surveys of landowning and office-holding showed that, amongst the political elites, there tended to be some emphasis on the county unit; yet, while there were distinct shire elites, there were also extra-county elements to their identities. A significant emphasis seems to have been on the meso-regional communities of Somerset/Dorset and Devon/Cornwall, corroborating the earlier exploration of the region’s broader geography, economy, and culture (pp. 347–8) ... Both sets of political elites seem to have become more entwined over the period, and there was a growing region-wide dimension… (p. 348).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“Henry VI’s regime (1450–61):
Henry VI’s inadequacy is widely held to have been the primary cause of the political upheavals of the mid-fifteenth century. To assess how this affected the south-west it is necessary, first, to give a brief regional review introducing the major figures; then, to consider the realities of governance, patronage, and landholding in Somerset, Dorset, Devon, and Cornwall. It is only after surveys of the county elites that a regional overview can be undertaken, which summarises the notable aspects, and evaluates those features that were truly ‘regional’ in nature by relating shire and provincial perspectives to national politics and governance (p. 149).
In summary, it seems that the dukes of Somerset could not only depend on the cooperation of those directly associated with them (such as the Caraunts), but could also rely on the support of others indirectly through secondary patrons such as Stourton and Hungerford. So, including Stourton-Hungerford clients as indirect connections, analysis of shire positions indicates the extent to which the Beauforts’ influence probably pervaded Somerset political society. Beaufort associates had regularly fulfilled local offices since the 1420s, and of the sheriffs’ terms between 1437 and 1450, almost half were undertaken by Beaufort clients. In comparison, between 1450 and 1461, over a third of sheriffs’ terms were served by Beaufort clients (p. 155).
As discussed regarding Devon, during the earl of Devon’s long minority, leading Devon gentry–Sir William Bonville and his clientele–involved themselves in Courtenay dependants’ affairs; hence, on his majority, the young earl lacked local support. The relationship between the earl and Bonville became poisoned after Sir William was designated steward of duchy estates in the county in 1437. This challenge to his authority enraged the earl to resort to violence (p. 174).
In the south-west, if the Beauforts provided a Lancastrian focus in the eastern counties, then the duchy of Cornwall provided another further west, where [Lord] Bonville also provided a specifically Yorkist focus (pp. 186–7).
Therefore, by a combination of estates, royal offices, and prince’s council membership, [James Butler, Earl of] Wiltshire might have become a provincial magnate–and a national power-broker–if he had had a longer period of time in which to establish himself (p. 188).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“Edward IV’s policy of ‘Regional Governance’ (1461–71):
During Edward IV’s first reign, Somerset politics was still influenced by the Stourton and Hungerford affinities which may have sought the patronage of Edward’s courtier, Humphrey Stafford. He was the only son of the Beaufort-Stourton client William Stafford by Katherine Chideock, and it was because of his Chideock inheritance (principally focussed in Somerset, Dorset, and Wiltshire) that he was destined to be a leading member of the Somerset gentry. In the later 1450s, Stafford may have been associated with the earl of Wiltshire whose first wife was his cousin (pp. 192–3).
The Bonville-FitzWaryn alliance had dominated Devon politics throughout the 1440s and 1450s (see Chapter 5) but on Bonville’s death in 1461, his sole heir was his infant great-granddaughter, Cecily. Naturally, a child could not provide adequate leadership to the Bonville-FitzWaryn connection. Moreover, Bonville’s allies, Lord FitzWaryn and Sir Philip Courtenay, were also both entering their sixties (both were deceased before 1470), and similarly could not provide the dynamic direction that was required. Into this leadership void, stepped Lord Stafford (p. 207).
…[Humphrey, Lord] Stafford [of Southwick] became a crucial national–regional power-broker–one of the pillars upon which rested the pediment of Yorkist government (p. 210).
It seems clear that Lord Stafford’s land-holding, office-holding, and clientele suggest that he acted as a political core for the south-west region. Stafford’s inheritances already made him a significant figure in Somerset and Dorset but, favoured by Edward IV, he was granted extensive lands forfeited by Lancastrians throughout the south-west, such as the estates of the earldom of Devon. In addition to his own properties, Stafford was showered with many offices in Somerset and Dorset, as well as other positions of immense significance in the region–in particular, his endowment with the most important duchy of Cornwall offices ensured that he dominated Cornwall (p. 221). It seems quite understandable to find that, as a figure of local, regional, and national importance, Lord Stafford’s associations were regional in nature: he was connected to major figures from each county… (pp. 221–2).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“Edward IV’s second reign (1471–83):
The involvement of household retainers in local government was one aspect that was common to all counties. There were a number of household sheriffs, as shown, and there seems to have been little difference in this policy from Edward’s first reign or, indeed, from that of Henry VI (p. 264).
During his second reign, Edward persisted in pursuing his ideal of regional governance: his favourites were established as provincial ‘governors’ just as during the 1460s (p. 264)… However, just as in his first reign, the serious faults of this vicegerential system inevitably re-surfaced: focusing royal patronage on a limited number of courtiers encouraged the view that the regime was exclusive; but, more importantly–given the motivation–any regional magnate would have had the resources and capacity, potentially, to depose the king (pp. 264–5).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“Richard III’s government (1483–5):
The scale of the insurgency in the south-west–and the consequent reality of Richard’s post-sedition lack of support–forced him into inserting short-term leaders into localities. Richard’s solution was to depend upon those of his courtiers he did trust–his own ducal northern retainers. Hence, in order to remedy his lack of support, he inserted his trusted northerners into the southern counties, including the south-west; naturally, those shires with more intrigants required a greater number of Richard’s imposed supporters (pp. 298–9).
Richard’s intensely difficult circumstances meant that, ideally, he would have to over-endow magnates–in the short-term–to be certain to secure their support. So, Richard’s distribution of patronage may have been too restrained for his precarious situation. Perhaps it was the reserved character of patronage that provoked [the Duke of] Buckingham to rebel. Similarly, it may have been the limited nature of their endowments that weakened the authority of Richard’s [Northern] plantations (p. 302).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
“Henry VII’s regime (1485–1500):
From these south-western shire surveys it appears that there was not one magnate who provided a ‘political centre’ for the region during Henry’s reign: no leading peer seems to have had the requisite combination of landholding, office-holding, and associations spread throughout all the counties. Rather, it seems that two south-western meso-regional magnates might be discerned: Lords Daubeney and Willoughby (p. 341).
The alliances of the two most influential Cornish families during this period, the Edgcumbes and the Arundells, with Lord Willoughby [de Broke] emphasises the peer’s importance in the governance of Devon and Cornwall… In summary, it seems that, as in Devon, the chief magnate in Cornwall was Lord Willoughby. He could not rely on the support only of those associated directly with him, but on the aid of other local figures through his secondary patrons, [John, Lord] Dinham, [Edward Courtenay, Earl of] Devon, [John] Arundell, and the Edgcumbes (p. 336).
The intermediate focus of royal authority between county and centre in Henry VI’s later years and under Edward IV had been the regional governor. The conciliar governance of Richard III’s Council of the North was continued by the Tudors who reinstituted this council, and the prince’s council in Wales and the Marches, while also creating a regional council in the Midlands focussed on Henry’s mother. However, in the south-west no single magnate or council was given such regional power, which may have been because Henry’s chief magnates were his loyal household officers, his steward and chamberlain… Henry VII’s governance–as chiefly restorative rather than innovatory–might therefore be described as a renewed monarchy, which, it could be said, by revitalising political structures, finally managed to hoist the ensign of settlement above the battlefields of the Wars of the Roses (p. 344).”
Source: Political Elites in South-West England, 1450–1500: Politics, Governance, and the Wars of the Roses
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