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Quote by Alexander Hamilton

“The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.”

Quote by Alexander Hamilton

Work

The Federalist

Written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers are a series of essays that advocate for the ratification of the United States Constitution. The essays, published under the pseudonym 'Publius,' delve into the philosophical underpinnings of the new government, emphasizing the need for a strong central authority while protecting individual liberties. more

Author

Alexander Hamilton
Alexander Hamilton

Alexander Hamilton was a Founding Father of the United States, born on January 11, 1757, and died on July 12, 1804. He played a crucial role in the American Revolutionary War and was instrumental in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. As the first Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton promoted fiscal stability and economic growth, establishing the First Bank of the United States and proposing solutions for federal debt. His ideas and policies had a profound impact on the early political and economic development of the United States. more

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“The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.”