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Quote by Guy P. Harrison

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Guy P. Harrison
Guy P. Harrison

Guy P. Harrison is a renowned journalist, born in 1963. He is known for his in-depth investigative reporting and sharp insights into social issues. more

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“Why, Anytos, I have fought as a democrat, here and in Samos, only because Sokrates taught me to think for myself. And Plato forsook the tyrants, though some were his kin, for Sokrates’ sake. He sets each man seeking the truth that is in him.” I could see him waiting for me to cease, to say what he had ready to say, exactly as if I had not spoken. I had felt easy with him, liking the way he treated every man as an equal; but it is strange to speak with someone one’s thoughts do not reach. Of a sudden it was as if a great desert surrounded me; I even felt the fear of Pan, driver of herds, as one does in lonely places.”

“Overview of the Fallacy of Division by Austin Cline In critical thinking, we often come across statements that fall victim to the fallacy of division. This common logical fallacy refers to an attribution placed onto an entire class, assuming that each part has the same property as the whole. These can be physical objects, concepts, or groups of people. By grouping elements of a whole together and assuming that every piece automatically has a certain attribute, we are often stating a false argument. This falls into the category of a fallacy of grammatical analogy. It can apply to many arguments and statements we make, including the debate over religious beliefs. The fallacy of division is similar to the fallacy of composition but in reverse. This fallacy involves someone taking an attribute of a whole or a class and assuming that it must also necessarily be true of each part or member. The fallacy of division takes the form of: X has property P. Therefore, all parts (or members) of X have this property P. Here are some obvious examples of the Fallacy of Division: The United States is the richest country in the world. Therefore, everyone in the United States must be rich and live well. [So pointing out one poor American does not refute the proposition that the United States is a rich country.]”

“Formal academic philosophy glorifies the intellect and thus makes research into what are, after all, incidentals- if we consider philosophy as the supreme means of investigating the problems of life and the universe. The Qabalah makes the primary claim that the intellect contains within itself a principle of self-contradiction, and that, therefore, it is an unreliable instrument to use in the great Quest for Truth. Numerous academic philosophers have likewise arrived at a similar conclusion. Some of the greater of these have despaired of ever devising a suitable method of transcending this limitation, and became sceptics. Others, seeing simply the solution, have seized upon intuition, or to be more accurate, the intellectual concept of intuition, leaving us, however, with no methods of checking and verifying that intuition, which in consequence is so liable to degenerate into mere guesswork, coloured by personal inclination and abetted by gross wish-phantasm.”

“Chesterton's topic is nothing less than the fundamental contrast between deductive logic, true of all possible worlds, and inductive logic, capable only of telling us how we may reasonably expect this world to behave. Let us hasten to add that Chesterton's analysis is in full agreement with the views of modern logicians. Perhaps his "test of the imagination" is not strictly accurate--who can "imagine" the four-dimensional constructions of relativity?-but in essence his position is unassailable. Logical and mathematical statements are true by definition. They are "empty tautologies," to use a current phrase, like the impressive maxim that there are always six eggs in half a dozen. Nature, on the other hand, is under no similar constraints. Fortunately, her "weird repetitions," as GK calls them, often conform to surprisingly low-order equations. But as Hume and others before Hume made clear, there is no logical reason why she should behave so politely.”