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Quote by Roger Schank

“In summary, a good teacher does the following: - never tells a student anything that the teacher thinks is true - never allows himself to be the ultimate judge of his own students' success - teacher practice first, theory second (if he must teach theory at all) - does not come up with lists of knowledge that every student must know - doesn't teach anything unless he can easily explain the use of learning it - assigns no homework, unless that homework is to produce something - groups students according to their interests and abilities, not their ages - ensures that any reward to a student is intrinsic - teaches students things they may actually need to know after they leave school - helps students come up with their own explanations when they have made a mistake - never assumes that a student is listening to what he is saying - never assumes that students will do what he asks them to do if what he asked does not relate to a goal they truly hold - never allows pleasing the teacher to be the goal of the student - understands that students won't do what he tells them if they don't understand what is being asked of them - earns the respect of students by demonstrating abilities - motivate students to do better, and does not help them to do better - understands that his job is to get students to do something - understands that experience, not teachers, changes belief systems - confuses students - does not expect credit for good teaching”

Quote by Roger Schank

Author

Roger Schank
Roger Schank

Roger Schank (born 1946) is an American cognitive scientist, artificial intelligence researcher, and educational innovator. He is best known for his pioneering work in natural language processing, case-based reasoning, and story-centered learning theory. A founder of the Yale Artificial Intelligence Project, Schank developed influential theories including conceptual dependency, script theory, and dynamic memory models. His research emphasizes the narrative nature of human thinking and has been applied to create AI-based educational systems. He has founded several edtech companies and authored numerous books on learning and cognition. more

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