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Tagliar corto

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Dino Basili

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“Я реально думал, что у Мика не хватит наглости гастролировать без нас. Это была бы самая жесткая пощечина, которую только можно придумать. Это был бы смертный приговор впредь до подачи апелляции. И все ради чего? Но я ошибался и потому был в бешенстве и смертельной обиде. Мик таки поехал в тур. И тогда я ему устроил разгон, в основном в прессе. Первый выстрел звучал так, что, если он сначала не хочет играть концерты со Stones, а потом берет и едет в тур с группой “Хер и Чмырь”, я ему, сука, пасть порву. И Мик ответил со всем благородством: “Я люблю Кита, я им восхищаюсь… но я не чувствую, что мы можем с ним дальше сотрудничать на самом деле”. Я уж и не упомню всех наездов и подъебов, которых я наговорил, – “диско-хлопец”, “маленький дрочевый ансамбль Джаггера”, “что бы ему не записаться в Aerosmith?” – такого рода вещами я кормил тогда благодарные таблоиды. Все опустилось довольно низко. Однажды журналист спросил меня: “Когда вы уже перестанете собачиться друг с другом?” “У собаки и спросите”, – сказал я.”

“The living body cannot be defined in terms of the binary opposites that structure conceptual reflection. The body is neither "subject nor object," neither "in itself" nor "for itself," neither res extensa nor res cogito. Rather the body is the mean between extremes—the "milieu" in which opposites like interiority and exteriority, as well as subjectivity and objectivity, intersect. Never reducible to the differences it simultaneously joins and separates, the body is forever entre-deux.”

“It is impossible to understand Crowley. unless we grasp that, like Madame Blavatsky and Mathers and Yeats and Florence Farr, he took magic as seriously as Lord Rutherford took atomic physics. Literary commentators often make the same mistake about Yeats: that he regarded magic as a romantic exercise in suspension of disbelief. Yeat's [sic] magical notebooks reveal this to have been untrue; they go into overwhelming detail about magical procedures and symbols and show that he continued to be obsessed by it long after he ceased to be a member of the Golden Dawn.”

“Why was it sensible for Americans to transubstantiate a convention into the virtual embodiment of the People? After all, as with an ordinary legislative assembly, a convention assembly may improve the ultimate quality of public deliberation, see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 342 (J. Madison), but only by excluding most citizens, thereby raising fiduciary/agency problems. An answer based on organization theory/incentive analysis might focus on how a ratification convention is structured differently from an ordinary legislature in ways that enhance monitoring and improve public accountability. First, the People select convention delegates in a special election. Second, delegates are generally convened to consider a single issue (ratification). Third and related, the basic choice set is binary (yes-no), reducing agenda manipulation problems and decreasing the monitoring problems that exist in an ordinary legislature with virtually infinite possibilities of side deals and vote trading. Fourth, conventions immediately disband and disperse among the People, reducing the problem of legislators entrenching themselves and developing their own institutional perspectives. Finally, a convention enhances a sense of public-spiritedness and individual moral responsibility among both voters and delegates. Calling a "convention" signals to all concerned that the polity is entering a high-stakes moment when basic ground rules will be hammered out. Interestingly, criminal juries (deciding the single issue of individual guilt or innocence) possess many more convention attributes than do ordinary legislatures.”

“The sovereignty of "We the People of the United States" is admittedly an abstraction—an idea. But abstractions often have legal consequences. And the single idea of popular sovereignty generates a powerful set of legal implications covering a vast range of constitutional issues from limited government and judicial review to federalism and separation of powers to nullification and constitutional amendment. In one vital area of contemporary jurisprudence, however, the Supreme Court has fashioned doctrine wholly antithetical to the Constitution's organizing principle of popular sovereignty. By allowing both federal and state governments to invoke "sovereign immunity" from liability for constitutional violations, the Court has misinterpreted the Federalist Constitution's text, warped its unifying structure, and betrayed the intellectual history of the American Revolution that gave it birth. In effect, the Court has transformed "sovereignty" into the very tool of government supremacy that our Revolutionary forebears wielded pen and sword to destroy.”