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Quote by Alfred Bester

“Here were the somatic messages that fed the cauldron; cell reactions by the incredible billion, organic cries, the muted drone of muscletone, sensory sub-currents, blood-flow, the wavering superheterodyne of blood pH ... all whirling and churning in the balancing pattern that formed the girl's psyche. The never-ending make-and-break of synapses contributed a crackling hail of complex rhythms. Packed in the changing interstices were broken images, half-symbols, partial references ... The ionised nuclei of thought.”

Quote by Alfred Bester

Work

The Demolished Man

In this novel, a telepathic detective investigates a murder case, leading to a profound examination of the nature of free will and the potential dangers of mind control. more

Author

Alfred Bester
Alfred Bester

Alfred Bester, born on December 18, 1913, in New York, and died on September 30, 1987, was an influential American science fiction author known for his unique literary style and profound philosophical insights. more

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