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Wittgenstein Quotes

Browse 24 quotes about Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein Quotes

“In the eighteenth century, philosophers considered the whole of human knowledge, including science, to be their field and discussed questions such as: Did the universe have a beginning? However, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, science became too technical and mathematical for the philosophers, or anyone else except a few specialists. Philosophers reduced the scope of their inquiries so much that Wittgenstein, the most famous philosopher of this century, said, "The sole remaining task for philosophy is the analysis of language." What a comedown from the great tradition of philosophy from Aristotle to Kant!”

PhilosophyScienceWittgenstein
Book:A Brief History of Time
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“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is “purely descriptive.”

PhilosophyScienceWittgensteinLudwig WittgensteinMetaphilosophyThe Blue Book
Author:Ludwig Wittgenstein
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“This is all that “ordinary” in the phrase “ordinary language philosophy” means, or ought to mean. It does not refer to particular words of wide use, nor to particular sorts of men. It reminds us that whatever words are said and meant are said and meant by particular men, and that to understand what they (the words) mean you must understand what they (whoever is using them) means, and that sometimes men, do not see what they mean, that usually they cannot say what they mean, that for various reasons they may not know what they mean, and that when they are forced to recognize this they feel they do not, and perhaps cannot, mean anything, and they are struck dumb.”

PhilosophyAustinWittgensteinOrdinary Language
Author:Stanley Cavell
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“In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification — and so belongs to different symbols — or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way. Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of something, but also of something's happening. (In the proposition, 'Green is green'— where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective — these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols.)”

PhilosophyLogicWittgensteinAnalytical PhilosophyLanguage Philosophy
Book:Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
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“Earlier fundamental work of Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Whorf, etc., as well as my own attempt to use this earlier thinking as an epistemological base for psychiatric theory, led to a series of generalizations: That human verbal communication can operate and always does operate at many contrasting levels of abstraction. These range in two directions from the seemingly simple denotative level (“The cat is on the mat”). One range or set of these more abstract levels includes those explicit or implicit messages where the subject of discourse is the language. We will call these metalinguistic (for example, “The verbal sound ‘cat’ stands for any member of such and such class of objects”, or “The word, ‘cat’ has no fur and cannot scratch”). The other set of levels of abstraction we will call metacommunicative (e.g., “My telling you where to find the cat was friendly”, or “This is play”). In these, the subject of discourse is the relationship between the speakers. It will be noted that the vast majority of both metalinguistic and metacommunicative messages remain implicit; and also that, especially in the psychiatric interview, there occurs a further class of implicit messages about how metacommunicative messages of friendship and hostility are to be interpreted.”

PhilosophyScienceLogicWittgensteinBertrand RussellRussellLudwig WittgensteinWhiteheadLudwig Josef Johann WittgensteinAlfred North WhiteheadCarnapAlfred WhiteheadBenjamin Lee WhorfBenjamin WhorfBertrand Arthur William RussellRudolf CarnapWhorf
Author:Gregory Bateson
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“The mythic journey to the village of the pig people can be compared to the first trip into space and the view of Earth afforded thereby: the space trip does not actually distance us from ourselves as much as the mythic trip does. The journey from human reality to pig reality reprises an ancient 'reversal' in roles, from hunter to hunted, which has been an important wellspring of metaphoric thinking. The universal human value of being able to look back from a different place was noted by Wittgenstein, who also noted the difficulty of doing so - a dilemma of the human consciousness.”

SpaceAnimalHumanSpace TravelWittgensteinPerspectivism
Book:Bitter Shade: The Ecological Challenge of Human Consciousness
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“Even if we restrict ourselves to the comparatively limited conceptual repertoire for talking about such matters that early Wittgenstein makes available, we may already say this: in order to learn a first language, the potential speaker needs not only to learn to see the symbol in the sign, she needs the very idea of language to become actual in her. This formal aspect of what it is to be human—the linguistic capacity as such—is something that dawns with the learning of one’s first language, with one’s becoming the bearer of a linguistic practice. We touched above, in the reply to Sullivan, on how the Tractatus inherits and adapts yet a further feature of the Kantian enterprise of critique: it starts with the assumption not only that we already have the very faculty we seek to elucidate in philosophy, but also that the prosecution of the philosophical inquiry must everywhere involve the exercise of the very capacity it seeks to elucidate. The Tractatus does not seek to confer the power of language on us: we already have this and bring it to our encounter with the book. Hence, it does not seek to explain what language is (as it is sometimes put) from sideways-on—from a position outside language—but rather from the self-conscious perspective of someone who already, in seeking philosophical clarity about what language is, seeks clarity about herself qua linguistic being. Through its exercise, however, the book does seek to confer a heightened mastery of that capacity on us—a reflective self- understanding of its logic and its limits, and of the philosophical confusions that arise from misunderstandings thereof. This heightened mastery (like the general power itself) can be acquired only through forms of further exercise of that same capacity. What I just said about the Tractatus, at this level of methodological abstraction, is no less true of the method of the Philosophical Investigations. The author of the Tractatus, however, unlike later Wittgenstein, never pauses for even a moment to reflect upon what it means to learn to recognize the symbol in the sign through attending to contexts of significant use. Nevertheless, early Witt- genstein would certainly agree with his later self on this point: for the learner of language, light must gradually dawn over the whole—over sign and symbol together.”

LanguageLearningMasteryKantWittgenstein
Book:The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics
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“Here is another way of putting an aspect of that same parallel: just as The Critique of Pure Reason seeks to show us that the formal conditions of sensory consciousness of an object presuppose a form of synthesis that belongs to the understanding, so, too, the Tractatus seeks to show us that the formal conditions of sensory consciousness of the identity of a sign presupposes linguistic self-consciousness of the logical nexus of the symbol. Just as Kant seeks to show how, on the one hand, the understanding must bear on sensibility in order to have content (for it to represent anything), and how, on the other, the sensible manifold requires conferral of unity through the activity of the understanding to be more than merely blind (for it to amount to more than mere sensory noise); so, too, later Wittgenstein aims to show how, on the one hand, the symbol must find expression in the sign to be more than nothing (for it to say anything), and how, on the other, the form of the sign (in spoken language—its phonological form) presupposes the apprehension of its real possibilities for symbolizing (its logico-grammatical uses in acts of speech) in order for it to come into view as having the form that it does.”

ReasonLanguageUnderstandingKantSymbolSignWittgenstein
Book:The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics
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“How does one do justice to what occasions philosophical wonder in us without conferring false sublimity upon it? We said that what occasions Frege’s wonder—the absoluteness of the logical order—seems to him to be such that it cannot possibly be implicated in our dependence upon language: say, in our meaning to assert p in using a proposition to say one thing rather than another, or in our using just these words rather than some others to assert it. The Tractatus (while repudiating Frege’s conception that the nature of logic may in no way be implicated in that of language) still seeks a way to hold onto the idea that in logic it is not we who express, by means of signs, what we want; rather it is the nature of the essentially necessary signs—it is logic—that asserts itself. The later Wittgenstein, as we are about to see, seeks to undo this residual subliming of the logical in the Tractatus, while in no way seeking to dissipate the sense of wonder at the illimitable depth of the logical—(what he later calls) the grammatical—that shows itself in our forms of thought and life.”

LifeFormLanguageThoughtSignsWittgensteinFregeTractatus
Book:The Logical Alien: Conant and His Critics
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“All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much as the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.”

BeliefArgumentThoughtCertaintyHypothesisWittgensteinSystematic Thinking
Book:On Certainty
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“Hoe vaak hoorden we geen uitspraken in de zin van: “Wetenschappelijk onderzoek toonde aan dat …” of “Het is wetenschappelijk bewezen dat …” Daarbij neemt men aan dat wetenschap altijd waar is. Maar hoe betrouwbaar is wetenschap? Heel veel van wat we wetenschap noemen, en we als waar aanvaarden, is noch waar, noch onwaar, en behoort tot de metafysica. Gedurende een korte tijd (volgend op de publicatie van de Tractatus van Wittgenstein) zag het ernaar uit dat we een messcherp onderscheid konden maken tussen betrouwbare wetenschappelijke uitspraken en onbetrouwbare metafysische uitspraken. Maar Wittgenstein zette dat onderscheid zelf op de helling met de postume publicatie van zijn Philosophical Investigations. Nog later pakte de (overwegend Franse) postmoderne filosofie uit met de stelling dat er in de algehele wetenschap minder waarheid is vervat dan in een simpel literair gedicht. De tijd van betrouwbare algemene theorieën leek hopeloos voorbij. Is dat zo? Is cognitief denken onmogelijk geworden? Hierna volgt een reflectie. Het tijdgewricht waarin we leven, althans in de westerse wereld, noemt men de postmoderniteit. Het wordt gekenmerkt door grote onzekerheid en een gevoel van toenemende onveiligheid. Onzekerheid heerst rond onbeantwoorde vragen met betrekking tot de toekomst van de planeet, tot de duurzaamheid van de energievoorziening, tot de werkzekerheid, tot de stabiliteit van het gezin, tot de gedaalde sociale controle, tot de toename van het aantal asielzoekers, tot het bestaan van een god, enzovoort. Onveiligheid houdt verband met oorlog, met terrorisme, met criminaliteit. Het is de bedoeling al die fenomenen wetenschappelijk te bestuderen. Maar hoe zeker ben ik dat wetenschap nog steeds betrouwbaar is?”

AngstJean Pierre Van RossemWittgensteinWetenschapOnzekerheidPostmoderniteitTractatus
Book:Postmoderniteit: Onzekerheid & Onveiligheid
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“When I met Wittgenstein, I saw that Schlick's warnings were fully justified. But his behavior was not caused by any arrogance. In general, he was of a sympathetic temperament and very kind; but he was hypersensitive and easily irritated. Whatever he said was always interesting and stimulating and the way in which he expressed it was often fascinating. His point of view and his attitude toward people and problems, even theoretical problems, were much more similar to those of a creative artist than to those of a scientist; one might almost say, similar to those of a religious prophet or a seer. When he started to formulate his view on some specific problem, we often felt the internal struggle that occurred in him at that very moment, a struggle by which he tried to penetrate from darkness to light under an intense and painful strain, which was even visible on his most expressive face. When finally, sometimes after a prolonged arduous effort, his answers came forth, his statement stood before us like a newly created piece of art or a divine revelation. Not that he asserted his views dogmatically ... But the impression he made on us was as if insight came to him as through divine inspiration, so that we could not help feeling that any sober rational comment of analysis of it would be a profanation.”

ScienceRationalWittgensteinLudwig WittgensteinLudwig Josef Johann WittgensteinMoritz SchlickSchlickFriedrich Albert Moritz Schlick
Book:The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Volume 11
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“Philosophy is that activity by which the meaning of propositions is established or discovered; it is a question of what the propositions actually mean. The content, soul, and spirit of science naturally consist in what is ultimately meant by its sentences; the philosophical activity of rendering significant is thus the alpha and omega of all scientific knowledge. [Moritz Schlick interpreting Ludwig Wittgenstein's position]”

ScienceKnowledgeSyntaxWittgensteinLudwig WittgensteinLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein
Author:Moritz Schlick
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“—La gente no suele saber aplicar la filosofía. Dudo de que ni siquiera los filósofos sepan hacerlo. —La gente puede usar conceptos morales lo mismo que tú has usado ahora el concepto de la verdad para convencerme. Cualquiera puede hacerlo. —Quizá. Pero creo que la filosofía moral es algo que resulta desesperanzadamente personal. No puede ser comunicado. «Si un león hablase, no podríamos comprenderlo», ha dicho Wittgenstein.”

MoralFilosofíaVerdadWittgenstein
Book:A Fairly Honourable Defeat
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