“[M]ost Husserl scholars ... seem to be blind to the future and have eyes only for the present. For they are so interested in the present in order to make phenomenology ... compatible with the most fashionable trends of contemporary philosophy ... that they do not realize that - in so doing - nothing will be left of phenomenology in the future. Indeed, Husserl’s phenomenology has already been stripped of its highest aspirations (viz., that of developing a full-fledged theory of reason able to provide a new foundation for metaphysics and, linked to the latter, reforming humanity); it has already been stripped or freed of its most important methodological tools (e.g., the so-called transcendental reduction); more recently, even Heidegger’s phenomenology has been purged of its language (e.g., by translating Dasein as “mind”). [...] The desire to make phenomenology, specially Husserl’s thought, attractive to the present will merely relegate it to the past, for phenomenology seems to be suitable for the present only on condition that it is no longer phenomenology itself.” ReasonMetaphysicsRationalismPhenomenologyHusserlFoundationalism Book:Husserl and the A Priori: Phenomenology and Rationality Source: Husserl and the A Priori: Phenomenology and Rationality