Quotessence
Home / Books / The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine

The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine

Book by Michael Lewis · 13 quotes · Recession, Wall Street, Subprime Mortgage Bonds

Filter quotes by topic

AllRecessionWall StreetSubprime Mortgage BondsCredit Default SwapGoldman SachsSubprime Mortgage LoansMike BurryMortgage BondsSteve Eisman2008AigAsset BubbleCharles LedleyCornwall CapitalCredit Default SwapsDebtFraudJames MaiAlan GreenspanB C Mortgage

The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine Quotes

“The simple measure of sanity in housing prices, Zelman argued, was the ratio of median home price to income. Historically, in the United States, it ran around 3:1; by late 2004, it had risen nationally, to 4:1. “All these people were saying it was nearly as high in some other countries,” says Zelman. “But the problem wasn’t just that it was four to one. In Los Angeles it was ten to one and in Miami, eight-point-five to one.”

Real EstateRecession2008
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“When Steve Eisman stumbled into this new, rapidly growing industry of specialty finance, the mortgage bond was about to be put to a new use: making loans that did not qualify for government guarantees. The purpose was to extend credit to less and less creditworthy homeowners, not so that they might buy a house but so that they could cash out whatever equity they had in the house they already owned.”

CreditDebtEquityRecessionHomeownersLoansMortgage BondsSteve Eisman
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“Because the lenders sold many—though not all—of the loans they made to other investors, in the form of mortgage bonds, the industry was also fraught with moral hazard. “It was a fast-buck business,” says Jacobs. “Any business where you can sell a product and make money without having to worry how the product performs is going to attract sleazy people.”

Wall StreetRecessionMortgage Bonds
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“It is ludicrous to believe that asset bubbles can only be recognized in hindsight,” he wrote. “There are specific identifiers that are entirely recognizable during the bubble’s inflation. One hallmark of mania is the rapid rise in the incidence and complexity of fraud…. The FBI reports mortgage-related fraud is up fivefold since 2000.” Bad behavior was no longer on the fringes of an otherwise sound economy; it was its central feature.”

EconomyFraudRecessionSubprime Mortgage LoansAsset Bubble
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“Long Beach Savings was the first existing bank to adopt what was called the “originate and sell” model. This proved such a hit—Wall Street would buy your loans, even if you would not!—that a new company, called B&C mortgage, was founded to do nothing but originate and sell.”

Wall StreetRecessionSubprime Mortgage LoansB C MortgageLong Beach SavingsOriginate And Sell
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“By early 2005 all the big Wall Street investment banks were deep into the subprime game. Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley all had what they termed “shelves” for their subprime wares, with strange names like HEAT and SAIL and GSAMP, that made it a bit more difficult for the general audience to see that these subprime bonds were being underwritten by Wall Street’s biggest names.”

Wall StreetRecessionGoldman SachsSubprime Mortgage LoansSubprime Mortgage CrisisBear StearnsMerrill LynchMorgan StanleySubprime Bonds
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“Back in July 2003, he’d written them a long essay on the causes and consequences of what he took to be a likely housing crash: “Alan Greenspan assures us that home prices are not prone to bubbles—or major deflations—on any national scale,” he’d said. “This is ridiculous, of course…. In 1933, during the fourth year of the Great Depression, the United States found itself in the midst of a housing crisis that put housing starts at 10% of the level of 1925. Roughly half of all mortgage debt was in default. During the 1930s, housing prices collapsed nationwide by roughly 80%.”

Wall StreetRecessionSubprime Mortgage LoansAlan GreenspanAsset Bubble
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image

“There was more than one way to think about Mike Burry’s purchase of a billion dollars in credit default swaps. The first was as a simple, even innocent, insurance contract. Burry made his semiannual premium payments and, in return, received protection against the default of a billion dollars’ worth of bonds. He’d either be paid zero, if the triple-B-rated bonds he’d insured proved good, or a billion dollars, if those triple-B-rated bonds went bad. But of course Mike Burry didn’t own any triple-B-rated subprime mortgage bonds, or anything like them. He had no property to “insure” it was as if he had bought fire insurance on some slum with a history of burning down. To him, as to Steve Eisman, a credit default swap wasn’t insurance at all but an outright speculative bet against the market—and this was the second way to think about it.”

Wall StreetRecessionGoldman SachsCredit Default SwapSubprime Mortgage BondsMike BurrySteve EismanAig
Book:The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine
Create image