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Quote by David Papineau

“The orthodox view of colour experience assumes that, when we see a colour difference between two surfaces viewed side-by-side, this is because we have different responses to each of the two surfaces viewed singly. Since we can detect colour differences between something like ten million different surfaces, this implies that we are capable of ten million colour responses to surfaces viewed singly.”

Quote by David Papineau

Author

David Papineau is a British philosopher known for his contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language. His research spans across various fields, including philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and moral philosophy. more

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“I don't think that we are capable of anything like this many possible colour responses. Instead I argue that the perception of colour differences between two surfaces viewed side-by-side is a gestalt phenomenon.”

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Author:David Papineau

“There is a brain mechanism that works to identify colour differences directly, without first identifying the absolute colour of each surface. So on my view there is no reason to suppose anything like ten million colour responses to surface viewed singly.”

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Author:David Papineau

“I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can be conceptualized, but I don't think he goes so far as to deny that it doesn't involve different responses to all the discriminable surfaces.”

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“On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms.”

Thinking Knows Needs Trying Would Be Views Brain Issues Appeals Hopeless Mechanism Introspection Orthodoxy

Author:David Papineau

“The 'phenomenal concept' issue is rather different, I think. Here the question is whether there are concepts of experiences that are made available to subjects solely in virtue of their having had those experiences themselves. Is there a way of thinking about seeing something red, say, that you get from having had those experiences, and so isn't available to a blind person?”

Thinking Way Persons Made Different Virtue Issues Seeing Subjects Concepts Red Blind Available Way Of Thinking Phenomenal Blind Person

Author:David Papineau

“After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so I don't think that introspection is powerful enough to resolve the specific issue about how many colours you can see.”

Thinking Enough Powerful Issues Concepts Colour Resolve Introspection Phenomenal Siding

Author:David Papineau

“I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms as well. We need to figure out what information is present in the mechanisms that constitute conscious colour perception.”

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Author:David Papineau

“If neuroscientific research shows that those mechanisms only contain comparative information about colour differences, and have 'thrown away' more fine-grained information about the absolute colours of single surfaces, then that would support my position, in a way that just introspecting our colour experiences can't.”

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Author:David Papineau

“The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind. How rich are the contents of visual perception? Does vision only tell us about shapes and colours, or does it also represent higher categories like lemon or umbrella?”

Thinking Mind Doe Helping Use Common Vision Rich Higher Shapes Prove Perception Contemporary Data Theme Visuals Colour Resolve Categories Lemons Umbrella Visual Perception

Author:David Papineau

“Again, when we view a scene fleetingly, do we consciously see all the details even though we don't retain them, or do we not see them in the first place? Neurological information is crucial to deciding these questions. After all, they are so interesting precisely because unaided introspection cannot resolve them. Rather we need to know what is going on in the brain activities that constitute visual awareness.”

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Author:David Papineau