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Quote by Michał Gołkowski

“Bo jak tu niby wyperswadować koledze, że to głupota. Jak wytłumaczyć mu, że bezterminowa umowa zlecenie, podpisana z aniołem o twarzy taliba, to idiotyzm i lekkomyślne szafowanie własnym losem.”

Quote by Michał Gołkowski

Book:Komornik
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Komornik

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Michał Gołkowski

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“From everything I've read, seeing these kids, including girls, playing, tells me we are doing right here. I have not seen a single sour face from any of the locals, and I don't see fear in their eyes. I'm sure I will learn more over time. They are poor; y'all cannot believe what little they have,... but we have restored their dignity and their lives... the Taliban had taken that away. (Read Marri's letter in book "Sewing Circles of Herat".) Kids, I am proud to be here doing what we are doing. - Adam Brown”

TalibanWar In Afghanistan 2001 PresentOperation Enduring Freedom
Book:Fearless: The Undaunted Courage and Ultimate Sacrifice of Navy Seal Team Six Operator Adam Brown
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“In Taliban-controlled portions of Pakistan, “Polio vaccinations have been declared haram by the ulema, and the government campaign has subsequently stalled.” Like car insurance, vaccinations are a form of presumption. Only with the expulsion of the Taliban from the Swat Valley in the late summer of 2009 was the Pakistani government able to resume vaccinations.”

PakistanTalibanPolio Vaccine
Book:The Closing of the Muslim Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern Islamist Crisis
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“It was strange to see the enemy up close, and at length. I could see fear in their faces - the knowledge that they could be cut down at any moment - but also a willingness to accept that fate in order to perform their solemn tasks. The fighters were young, as soldiers always are, dark beards beneath chestnut eyes. They were of Pashtun origin, but whether from Afghanistan or Pakistan, I could not tell. I only knew that they were the enemy, and when they returned with weapons, then we would kill them.”

WarCombatAfghanistanSoldiersTalibanAfghanistan Wa
Book:No Way Out: The Searing True Story of Men Under Siege
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“Talking to [him] that day, and [him] and the other Talibs, it seemed obvious enough that what lay at the foundation of the Taliban’s rule was fear, but not fear of the Taliban themselves, at least not in the beginning. No; it was fear of the past. Fear that the past would return, that it would come back in all its disaggregated fury. That the past would become the future. The beards, the burqas, the whips, the stones; anything, anything you want. Anything but the past.”

FearTalibanJihadism
Author:Dexter Filkins
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“I remember that [my brother's] first question concerned the centuries-old Buddha statues that were dynamited by the Taliban in March of that year, shortly before our encounter. Two Taliban combatants from Kandahar confidently responded that worshiping anything outside of Islam was unacceptable and that therefore these statues had to be destroyed. My brother looked at them and said, this time in Pashto, "There are still many sun- worshippers in this country. Will you also try to get rid of the sun and drop darkness over the Earth?”

BuddhismTerrorismIdolsTaliban
Author:Yahya Massoud
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“In sum, while from 2001 to 2005, drugs were simply not part of the US agenda in Afghanistan, since 2005, there has been more talk about drug control, and more counternarcotics operations have taken place. However, this does not mean that the United States is moving closer to conducting a real war on drugs. It is not the intensification of militaristic counterdrug missions per se that makes a drug war real, but the implementation of strategies known to reduce drug problems. On that count, Washington has failed. Further, the United States has continued to support allies involved in trafficking, and Obama stated explicitly that his drug war is instrumental in fighting the insurgency and not about eliminating drugs per se. Indeed, in 2009, his administration presented its new approach to narcotics and elaborated a target list of 50 "major drug traffickers who help finance the insurgency" to be killed or captured by the military. Therefore, if traffickers help the Taliban, they will be attacked – but if they support government forces, they apparently will be left alone. This suggests that the drug war is used to target enemies.”

AfghanistanTalibanWar On DrugsBarack ObamaOpioidsAfghanistan War
Book:Cruel Harvest, US Intervention in the Afghan Drug Trade - 2013
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“Mainstream commentary blames the size of the narcotics industry and much of what goes wrong in Afghanistan partly on corruption. But to focus on bad apples in the Afghan government and police misses the systemic responsibility of the United States and NATO for the dramatic expansion of opiates production since 2001 and for their support of numerous corrupt individuals in power. The United States attacked Afghanistan in association with Northern Alliance warlords and drug lords and showered them with weapons, millions of dollars, and diplomatic support. The empowerment and enrichment of those individuals enabled them to tax and protect opium traffickers, leading to the quick resumption of narcotics production after the hiatus of the 2000–2001 Taliban ban, as many observers have documented. Ahmed Rashid has written that the whole Afghan Interior Ministry "became a major protector of drug traffickers, and Karzai refused to clean it out. As warlord militias were demobilized and disarmed by the UN, commanders found new positions in the Interior Ministry and continued to provide protection to drug traffickers." The United States was not interested in cleaning Afghanistan of drug traffickers either. Thus, to blame "corruption" and "criminals" for the current state of affairs is to ignore the direct and predictable effects of US policies, which have followed a historical pattern of toleration and protection of strongmen involved in narcotics.”

AfghanistanTalibanWar On DrugsOpioidsAfghanistan War
Book:Cruel Harvest: US Intervention in the Afghan Drug Trade
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“Second, many of the United States’ local Afghan allies were involved in trafficking, from which they drew money and power. Destroying drug labs and poppy fields would have been, in effect, a direct blow to American operations and proxy fighters on the ground. As Western diplomats conceded at the time, "without money from drugs, our friendly warlords can’t pay their militias. It’s as simple as that." According to James Risen, this explains why the Pentagon and the White House refused to bomb the 25 or so drug facilities that the CIA had identified on its maps in 2001. Similarly, in 2005, the Pentagon denied all but 3 of 26 DEA requests for airlifts. Barnett Rubin summarized the US attitude well when he wrote in 2004 that when "he visits Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld meets military commanders whom Afghans know as the godfathers of drug trafficking. The message has been clear: Help fight the Taliban and no one will interfere with your trafficking." As a result, US military officials closed their eyes to the trade. An Army Green Beret said he was "specifically ordered to ignore heroin and opium when he and his unit discovered them on patrol." A US Senate report mentioned that "congressional committees received reports that U.S. forces were refusing to disrupt drug sales and shipments and rebuffing requests from the Drug Enforcement Administration for reinforcements to go after major drug kingpins.”

AfghanistanTalibanOpioidsAfghanistan WarDonald Rumsfeld
Book:Cruel Harvest: US Intervention in the Afghan Drug Trade
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