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Quote by Thomas Nagel

“Reason is universal because no attempted challenge to its results can avoid appealing to reason in the end-by claiming, for example, that what was presented as an argument is really a rationalization. This can undermine our confidence in the original method or practice only by giving us reasons to believe something else, so that finally we have to think about the arguments to make up our minds.”

Quote by Thomas Nagel

Book:Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994

Work

Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994

This volume compiles a selection of critical essays that delve into a range of intellectual and cultural themes, offering insights from the period between 1969 and 1994. more

Author

Thomas Nagel, born on July 4, 1937, is an American philosopher renowned for his contributions to moral philosophy, political philosophy, and epistemology. His works delve into themes such as free will, moral intuition, objectivity, philosophy of mind, and religion. more

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