“I don't know whether I can say that having a career in philosophy has turned out as I imagined, since in many ways I had little idea of what such a life would be like. But philosophy is still tremendously exciting to me, and the opportunity to think, and talk, and write about these issues has been wonderful.” ThinkingKnowsWayWritingLittlesHas BeensStillsI CanIdeasPhilosophyWould BeOpportunityCareersIssuesWonderfulExciting Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Work on causal theories of knowledge - early work by Armstrong, and Dretske, and Goldman - seemed far more satisfying. As I started to see the ways in which work in the cognitive sciences could inform our understanding of central epistemological issues, my whole idea of what the philosophical enterprise is all about began to change. Quine certainly played a role here, as did Putnam's (pre-1975) work in philosophy of science, and the exciting developments that went on in that time in philosophy of mind.” WayMindIdeasPhilosophyWholeUnderstandingRolesIssuesTheoryDevelopmentExcitingPhilosophicalEnterpriseSatisfyingCognitivePhilosophy Of ScienceArmstrongCognitive ScienceEarly WorkTheory Of Knowledge Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Externalists reject any such view. I think that the idea that we can tell, simply by way of reflection, whether our beliefs are justified, is deeply commonsensical. More than that, the idea that responsible epistemic agents ought to reflect on their beliefs, and hold them only if they somehow pass muster, is utterly natural.” IfsThinkingWayIdeasBeliefNaturalViewsOughtReflectionResponsibleAgentsRejectsJustifiedMuster Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Here, as in so many other cases, however, it turns out that a very commonsensical idea looks far less attractive when one examines some of the experimental work which is not available to us from the armchair.” LooksIdeasTurnsCasesAvailableAttractiveArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The idea that we should check on our unreflective belief acquisition sounds great, but we need to know whether the processes of reflection which we put to work serves to improve our reliability or not.” KnowsNeedsShouldIdeasBeliefProcessSoundReflectionChecksAcquisitionReliability Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just crazy.” PeopleThinkingShouldFirstsKindIdeasNaturalCrazy Author:Hilary Kornblith
“What I argue is that talk of knowledge plays an important role in theories within cognitive ethology. The idea is this. First, one sees cognitive ethologists arguing that we need to attribute propositional attitudes to some animals in order to explain the sophistication of their cognitive achievements.” NeedsFirstsImportantIdeasPlayOrderAnimalAttitudeRolesTheoryAchievementArguingAttributesCognitiveSophistication Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I do think that it is legitimate to talk of goals and functions in nature, and that these things can be made sense of in naturalistic terms. There is nothing at all contrary to naturalism in the idea of goal-directed systems.” ThinkingMadeIdeasGoalTermFunctionContraryNaturalism Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I am certainly open to the idea that this might be used to explain other philosophical categories besides knowledge. I have some real sympathy with the work of those moral realists who have tried to give naturalistic accounts of human flourishing, and who offer accounts of right action in such terms. (I suppose this is more evidence that I really do have deep affinities with Aristotle!)” GivingHumansIdeasRealMightActionUsedTermMoralOffersEvidenceAccountsPhilosophicalCategoriesRealistFlourishingAffinityRight Action Author:Hilary Kornblith
