“It started becoming clear to me how one might have views about the nature of mind and of knowledge which are empirically informed. This way of thinking about philosophical theorizing makes sense of how philosophy might be a legitimate intellectual activity, in a way that a good deal of the armchair philosophy, I believe, cannot.” ThinkingWayMindBelievePhilosophyMightI BelieveViewsDealsClearBecomingActivityIntellectualPhilosophicalMake SenseWay Of ThinkingArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I am concerned about epistemic normativity, and I don't think that it is just a hangover from a priori and armchair approaches. Some ways of forming beliefs are better than others, and epistemologists of all stripes, I believe, have a legitimate interest in addressing the issue of what makes some of these ways better than others.” ThinkingWayBelieveBeliefI BelieveInterestIssuesApproachConcernedHangoverStripesArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I believe, that empirically informed approaches to the question have issued in more illuminating answers than the old armchair approaches. But I think that it would be a terrible mistake to give up on addressing normative questions in epistemology.” ThinkingGivingBelieveWould BeI BelieveAnswersMistakeTerribleGiving UpApproachEpistemologyIlluminatingArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief is justified must somehow be internal to the agent. On some views, this amounts to the claim that these features must be accessible to introspection and armchair reflection. On others, it amounts only to the claim that they must be mental features.” BelieveBeliefI BelieveViewsDealsVirtueAmountApproachReflectionClaimsAgentsAppealsFeaturesInternalsIntrospectionJustifiedIntuitiveEpistemologyArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Rather, although belief may be adequate for explaining the behavior of individual animals - an animal which believes that p will behave no differently from an animal which knows that p - talk of knowledge is necessary once one begins to look at explaining the cognitive capacities of a species.” KnowsBelieveLooksMayIndividualBeliefAnimalBehaviorCapacitySpeciesBehaveAdequateExplainingCognitive Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I largely defer to the cognitive ethologists. I believe that the arguments that they make on this score are extremely persuasive. More than this, I do think as well that a priori objections by philosophers to successful research programs in the sciences have a very bad track record.” ThinkingBelieveWellsI BelieveSuccessfulRecordsResearchProgramArgumentTrackPhilosopherScoreObjectionsCognitivePersuasiveTrack Record Author:Hilary Kornblith
“When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined.” BelieveHumansKindDifferentI BelieveAnimalViewsReflectionTemptationHuman Knowledge Author:Hilary Kornblith
“My own reasons for favouring talk of natural kinds is just that I believe the best accounts of the success of scientific theories presupposes the existence of natural kinds.” BelieveKindReasonI BelieveNaturalMy OwnExistenceTheoryAccountsScientific Theory Author:Hilary Kornblith
“In my view, philosophers have shown a great deal more respect for the first-person point of view than it deserves. There's a lot of empirical work on the various psychological mechanisms by way of which the first-person point of view is produced, and, when we understand this, I believe, we can stop romanticising and mythologising the first-person perspective.” WayFirstsBelievePersonsI BelieveViewsDealsPerspectiveDeservePhilosopherVariousPoint Of ViewPsychologicalMechanismFirst PersonThis I Believe Author:Hilary Kornblith
“By putting the first-person point of view in a naturalistic perspective, I believe that we may genuinely come to understand it for the first time.” FirstsBelieveMayPersonsI BelieveViewsPerspectiveFirst TimePoint Of ViewFirst Person Author:Hilary Kornblith