“I am concerned about epistemic normativity, and I don't think that it is just a hangover from a priori and armchair approaches. Some ways of forming beliefs are better than others, and epistemologists of all stripes, I believe, have a legitimate interest in addressing the issue of what makes some of these ways better than others.” ThinkingWayBelieveBeliefI BelieveInterestIssuesApproachConcernedHangoverStripesArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief is justified must somehow be internal to the agent. On some views, this amounts to the claim that these features must be accessible to introspection and armchair reflection. On others, it amounts only to the claim that they must be mental features.” BelieveBeliefI BelieveViewsDealsVirtueAmountApproachReflectionClaimsAgentsAppealsFeaturesInternalsIntrospectionJustifiedIntuitiveEpistemologyArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Externalists reject any such view. I think that the idea that we can tell, simply by way of reflection, whether our beliefs are justified, is deeply commonsensical. More than that, the idea that responsible epistemic agents ought to reflect on their beliefs, and hold them only if they somehow pass muster, is utterly natural.” IfsThinkingWayIdeasBeliefNaturalViewsOughtReflectionResponsibleAgentsRejectsJustifiedMuster Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The idea that we should check on our unreflective belief acquisition sounds great, but we need to know whether the processes of reflection which we put to work serves to improve our reliability or not.” KnowsNeedsShouldIdeasBeliefProcessSoundReflectionChecksAcquisitionReliability Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The worry that unreflective belief acquisition may be unreliable, after all, applies equally to reflective belief acquisition: it too may be unreliable. To my mind, the plausibility of internalist views about justification is dramatically decreased when one becomes vividly aware of what introspection and reflection actually achieve.” MindMayBeliefViewsWorryAchieveReflectionJustificationIntrospectionAcquisitionUnreliable Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Talk of belief in these animals is not some kind of anthropomorphism. We simply cannot explain the kinds of problem solving and behavioral sophistication some species exhibit without supposing that they have genuine beliefs. But once these ethologists finish making the case for animal belief, they quickly move to talk of animal knowledge as well. What I argue is that this is not a mere façon de parler.” WellsKindProblemMovingBeliefAnimalCasesMereSpeciesArguingGenuineProblem SolvingExhibitsSophisticationSupposingSupposing ThatAnthropomorphism Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Rather, although belief may be adequate for explaining the behavior of individual animals - an animal which believes that p will behave no differently from an animal which knows that p - talk of knowledge is necessary once one begins to look at explaining the cognitive capacities of a species.” KnowsBelieveLooksMayIndividualBeliefAnimalBehaviorCapacitySpeciesBehaveAdequateExplainingCognitive Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The various processes of belief acquisition which are native to a species include ones which may allow for the reliable pick-up of information, which, in turn, allows individual members of the species to successfully negotiate their environment and satisfy their various desires.” MayDesireTurnsIndividualBeliefProcessEnvironmentInformationMembersPicksSpeciesVariousNativeAcquisition Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Ethologists thus have an interest in looking at these capacities for the reliable acquisition of belief, and it is not surprising that they have a name for the true beliefs which are the typical product of these reliable capacities. They call them items of knowledge. So I argue that talk of knowledge may thereby be seen to be embedded within a successful empirical theory.” MayNamesBeliefInterestSuccessfulProductsTheoryCapacityArguingSurprisingTypicalItemsAcquisitionEmbedded Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I argue is that philosophers have had a tendency to present a kind of mystical view of the powers of reflection. Unreflective belief acquisition is seen in mechanistic terms, but when philosophers talk about reflection, it is as if reflective processes are not bound by the kinds of limitations which inevitably arise from being embedded within the same causal structure which governs unreflective belief acquisition.” IfsKindBeliefProcessTermViewsReflectionStructureBoundsPhilosopherArguingAriseTendenciesLimitationMysticalAcquisitionEmbedded Author:Hilary Kornblith
