“When I first began studying philosophy, a good deal of what went on in analytic epistemology was focused on addressing the Gettier problem. At first, I became quite caught up in it, and the kind of analytical ingenuity required for the work appealed to me. After a while, however, I started to lose interest.” FirstsKindPhilosophyProblemInterestLosesDealsStudyCaughtFocusedCaught UpIngenuityEpistemologyAnalyticsStudying Philosophy Author:Hilary Kornblith
“It started becoming clear to me how one might have views about the nature of mind and of knowledge which are empirically informed. This way of thinking about philosophical theorizing makes sense of how philosophy might be a legitimate intellectual activity, in a way that a good deal of the armchair philosophy, I believe, cannot.” ThinkingWayMindBelievePhilosophyMightI BelieveViewsDealsClearBecomingActivityIntellectualPhilosophicalMake SenseWay Of ThinkingArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about the relevance of empirical work to philosophy, a good deal of their work is devoted to understanding features of our folk concepts, and in this respect, at least, I see them as making the same mistake as those armchair philosophers who are interested in conceptual analysis.” KindDifferentPhilosophyUnderstandingDealsMistakeApproachConceptsFolksPhilosopherFeaturesAnalysisAgreementDevotedRelevanceSame MistakesArmchairsMaking The Same Mistakes Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief is justified must somehow be internal to the agent. On some views, this amounts to the claim that these features must be accessible to introspection and armchair reflection. On others, it amounts only to the claim that they must be mental features.” BelieveBeliefI BelieveViewsDealsVirtueAmountApproachReflectionClaimsAgentsAppealsFeaturesInternalsIntrospectionJustifiedIntuitiveEpistemologyArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I have made some headway in addressing these questions, however, and succeeded in explaining how it is that the category of knowledge might play an important role in empirical theories. To the extent that talk of knowledge can be shown to play an explanatory role in such theories, the analogy I wish to make with paradigm natural kinds such as acids and aluminum starts to make a good deal of sense. This is, of course, connected with the issue of the role of intuitions in philosophy.” KindMadeImportantPhilosophyPlayMightCoursesWishNaturalDealsRolesIssuesTheoryConnectedIntuitionCategoriesExplainingAcidParadigmAnalogiesAluminum Author:Hilary Kornblith
“There has certainly been a great deal of work addressing the relationship between naturalism and the first-person perspective. Quite a number of philosophers have suggested that there are features of the first-person perspective that naturalism just cannot accommodate, whether it be qualitative character, or consciousness, or simply the ability we have to think of ourselves in a distinctively first-person manner.” ThinkingFirstsPersonsCharacterAbilityDealsNumbersConsciousnessPerspectivePhilosopherFeaturesFirst PersonAccommodateNaturalismQualitative Author:Hilary Kornblith
“In my view, philosophers have shown a great deal more respect for the first-person point of view than it deserves. There's a lot of empirical work on the various psychological mechanisms by way of which the first-person point of view is produced, and, when we understand this, I believe, we can stop romanticising and mythologising the first-person perspective.” WayFirstsBelievePersonsI BelieveViewsDealsPerspectiveDeservePhilosopherVariousPoint Of ViewPsychologicalMechanismFirst PersonThis I Believe Author:Hilary Kornblith
