“When I first began studying philosophy, a good deal of what went on in analytic epistemology was focused on addressing the Gettier problem. At first, I became quite caught up in it, and the kind of analytical ingenuity required for the work appealed to me. After a while, however, I started to lose interest.” FirstsKindPhilosophyProblemInterestLosesDealsStudyCaughtFocusedCaught UpIngenuityEpistemologyAnalyticsStudying Philosophy Author:Hilary Kornblith
“What I hankered for was an account of knowledge which would do far more than get our intuitions about cases right; I wanted a kind of account which would somehow be explanatory.” KindWantedCasesAccountsIntuition Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The kind of approach I take is different from much of experimental philosophy. Although the experimental philosophers and I are certainly in agreement about the relevance of empirical work to philosophy, a good deal of their work is devoted to understanding features of our folk concepts, and in this respect, at least, I see them as making the same mistake as those armchair philosophers who are interested in conceptual analysis.” KindDifferentPhilosophyUnderstandingDealsMistakeApproachConceptsFolksPhilosopherFeaturesAnalysisAgreementDevotedRelevanceSame MistakesArmchairsMaking The Same Mistakes Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Here, there is simply no substitute for the kind of work that experimental psychologists do, work which shows some mechanisms to be quite reliable, and others to be quite unreliable.” KindShowsSubstitutesMechanismPsychologistUnreliable Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I am quite wedded to the view that epistemologists should concern themselves with knowledge rather than our concept of knowledge. The analogy I like to draw here is with our understanding of (other) natural kinds.” ShouldKindUnderstandingNaturalViewsDrawsConceptsConcernAnalogies Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I think that when I first suggested the idea that knowledge should be viewed as a natural kind, many people thought this was just crazy.” PeopleThinkingShouldFirstsKindIdeasNaturalCrazy Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I have made some headway in addressing these questions, however, and succeeded in explaining how it is that the category of knowledge might play an important role in empirical theories. To the extent that talk of knowledge can be shown to play an explanatory role in such theories, the analogy I wish to make with paradigm natural kinds such as acids and aluminum starts to make a good deal of sense. This is, of course, connected with the issue of the role of intuitions in philosophy.” KindMadeImportantPhilosophyPlayMightCoursesWishNaturalDealsRolesIssuesTheoryConnectedIntuitionCategoriesExplainingAcidParadigmAnalogiesAluminum Author:Hilary Kornblith
“In my view, since the case can be made that knowledge too is a natural kind, the role of pretheoretical intuitions is similarly diminished in epistemology.” KindMadeNaturalViewsRolesCasesIntuitionEpistemology Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Bealer argues that the kind of naturalistic view which Quine holds will rob him of the ability to make the normative claims which (many) naturalists wish to make in epistemology. I don't think this is right about Quine, but I'm certain it's not right about my own view. To the extent that I can show that talk of knowledge is firmly rooted within empirical theories where it plays an important explanatory role, I thereby demonstrate its naturalistic credentials.” ThinkingKindI CanImportantPlayShowsCertainWishMy OwnAbilityViewsRolesTheoryClaimsArguingRootedEpistemologyNaturalistCredentials Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Talk of belief in these animals is not some kind of anthropomorphism. We simply cannot explain the kinds of problem solving and behavioral sophistication some species exhibit without supposing that they have genuine beliefs. But once these ethologists finish making the case for animal belief, they quickly move to talk of animal knowledge as well. What I argue is that this is not a mere façon de parler.” WellsKindProblemMovingBeliefAnimalCasesMereSpeciesArguingGenuineProblem SolvingExhibitsSophisticationSupposingSupposing ThatAnthropomorphism Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The fact that these scientific theories have a fine track record of successful prediction and explanation speaks for itself. (Which is not to say that I don't directly discuss the work of those philosophers who would disagree.) But even if we grant this, many will argue that scientific knowledge in humans, and, indeed, reflective knowledge in general, is quite different in kind from the knowledge we see in other animals.” IfsHumansKindDifferentFactsSpeakAnimalSuccessfulRecordsTheoryFineTrackPhilosopherArguingExplanationGrantsDisagreePredictionsScientific KnowledgeScientific TheoryTrack Record Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I argue is that philosophers have had a tendency to present a kind of mystical view of the powers of reflection. Unreflective belief acquisition is seen in mechanistic terms, but when philosophers talk about reflection, it is as if reflective processes are not bound by the kinds of limitations which inevitably arise from being embedded within the same causal structure which governs unreflective belief acquisition.” IfsKindBeliefProcessTermViewsReflectionStructureBoundsPhilosopherArguingAriseTendenciesLimitationMysticalAcquisitionEmbedded Author:Hilary Kornblith
“When reflection is thereby demystified, I believe that the temptation to view human knowledge as different in kind from animal knowledge is undermined.” BelieveHumansKindDifferentI BelieveAnimalViewsReflectionTemptationHuman Knowledge Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I do realise that talk of natural kinds dates back to Aristotle, but I'd better not say too much about ancient philosophers lest I be convicted of practicing history of philosophy without a license.” KindPhilosophyNaturalToo MuchAncientPhilosopherRealisingLicense Author:Hilary Kornblith
“My own reasons for favouring talk of natural kinds is just that I believe the best accounts of the success of scientific theories presupposes the existence of natural kinds.” BelieveKindReasonI BelieveNaturalMy OwnExistenceTheoryAccountsScientific Theory Author:Hilary Kornblith
“If we want to make sense of the possibility of successful inductive inference, and if we want to explain the possibility of laws of nature, we will need to appeal to something like natural kinds. This is, to be sure, a metaphysical commitment, but it is a metaphysical commitment that is implicit in science, as I see it.” IfsWantNeedsKindLawNaturalSuccessfulPossibilityCommitmentAppealsMake SenseMetaphysicalLaws Of NatureImplicitInference Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The kinds of claims I make about knowledge are thus meant to be illustrative of a general argumentative strategy which might well bear fruit in areas of philosophy which I have not thus far explored.” WellsKindPhilosophyMightBearsAreasClaimsStrategyFruitMeant To Be Author:Hilary Kornblith
“For one thing, I think that there are questions which philosophers raise which, although science bears on them, are not typically the central focus of those who work in the sciences. At the same time, I don't have a view of philosophy which marks it out as different in kind from scientific work” ThinkingKindDifferentPhilosophyViewsFocusOne ThingBearsMarkRaisesPhilosopher Author:Hilary Kornblith
“No one worries terribly much about who the questions belong to, or whether a given contribution is really philosophy or, instead, properly nothing but science. Perhaps another way to put this is that, although I think that knowledge is a natural kind, I don't think that philosophy is.” ThinkingWayKindPhilosophyGivenNaturalWorryContributionAnother Way Author:Hilary Kornblith
