“[W]here the rationalist sees contact with theoretical considerations as a source of contamination, we should instead view such influence as potentially beneficial. Theory-mediated judgment is not automatically “contaminated”; under the right circumstances, and under the guidance of appropriate theory, it is instead a source of correction and illumination. We should not search for a realm of reason somehow insulated from and uninformed by our best available theories. Instead we should welcome the prospect of a conception of rational inference which is itself fully vetted by all available evidence.” EpistemologyRationalismEmpiricismA Priori Judgments Author:Hilary Kornblith
“When I first began studying philosophy, a good deal of what went on in analytic epistemology was focused on addressing the Gettier problem. At first, I became quite caught up in it, and the kind of analytical ingenuity required for the work appealed to me. After a while, however, I started to lose interest.” FirstsKindPhilosophyProblemInterestLosesDealsStudyCaughtFocusedCaught UpIngenuityEpistemologyAnalyticsStudying Philosophy Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I believe, that empirically informed approaches to the question have issued in more illuminating answers than the old armchair approaches. But I think that it would be a terrible mistake to give up on addressing normative questions in epistemology.” ThinkingGivingBelieveWould BeI BelieveAnswersMistakeTerribleGiving UpApproachEpistemologyIlluminatingArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Internalist approaches to epistemology, I believe, have a great deal of intuitive appeal. Internalists believe that the features in virtue of which a belief is justified must somehow be internal to the agent. On some views, this amounts to the claim that these features must be accessible to introspection and armchair reflection. On others, it amounts only to the claim that they must be mental features.” BelieveBeliefI BelieveViewsDealsVirtueAmountApproachReflectionClaimsAgentsAppealsFeaturesInternalsIntrospectionJustifiedIntuitiveEpistemologyArmchairs Author:Hilary Kornblith
“I do think that an understanding of contemporary work in the cognitive sciences has a profound effect on how one views the workings of the mind. It doesn't work the way we pretheoretically think it does. Such an understanding, of course, should have a large effect on one's views in philosophy of mind, but also in epistemology.” ThinkingWayShouldMindDoePhilosophyCoursesUnderstandingViewsEffectsShould HaveProfoundContemporaryCognitiveEpistemologyCognitive Science Author:Hilary Kornblith
“The great philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries did not think that epistemological questions floated free of questions about how the mind works. Those philosophers took a stand on all sorts of questions which nowadays we would classify as questions of psychology, and their views about psychological questions shaped their views about epistemology, as well they should have.” ThinkingShouldMindWellsViewsPsychologyCenturyShould HavePhilosopherPsychologicalEpistemology18th CenturyGreat Philosophers Author:Hilary Kornblith
“So I do, of course, reject much that is central not only to the psychology of Descartes and Kant, but to their epistemology as well. No doubt, the best available theories of today will look primitive in comparison with what we are in a position to understand hundreds of years from now.” YearsWellsLooksTodayCoursesDoubtPsychologyPositionTheoryAvailableNo DoubtComparisonRejectsPrimitiveEpistemology Author:Hilary Kornblith
“One of the goals of scientific theorising is to develop concepts which are adequate to the phenomena under study. In my view, things should work the same way in epistemology. We want to know what knowledge actually amounts to, not what our folk concept of knowledge is, since, just as with our pretheoretical concept of acidity, it might contain all sorts of misunderstandings and leave out all manner of important things.” KnowsWayWantShouldImportantMightGoalViewsStudyAmountConceptsImportant ThingsFolksMisunderstandingAdequateEpistemology Author:Hilary Kornblith
“In my view, since the case can be made that knowledge too is a natural kind, the role of pretheoretical intuitions is similarly diminished in epistemology.” KindMadeNaturalViewsRolesCasesIntuitionEpistemology Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Bealer has a number of reasons for thinking that a naturalistic epistemology is self-undermining. Let me focus on one of these. (I've tried to take on all of them in the first chapter of Knowledge and Its Place in Nature.)” ThinkingFirstsSelfReasonNumbersFocusLet MeChaptersEpistemologyUndermining Author:Hilary Kornblith
“Bealer argues that the kind of naturalistic view which Quine holds will rob him of the ability to make the normative claims which (many) naturalists wish to make in epistemology. I don't think this is right about Quine, but I'm certain it's not right about my own view. To the extent that I can show that talk of knowledge is firmly rooted within empirical theories where it plays an important explanatory role, I thereby demonstrate its naturalistic credentials.” ThinkingKindI CanImportantPlayShowsCertainWishMy OwnAbilityViewsRolesTheoryClaimsArguingRootedEpistemologyNaturalistCredentials Author:Hilary Kornblith
