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“To economists, everything revolves around scarcity - after all, even the biggest spenders can't buy everything. However, the perception of scarcity is not ubiquitous. An empty schedule feels different than a jam-packed workday. And that's not some harmless little feeling. Scarcity impinges on your mind. People behave differently when they perceive a thing to be scarce. What that thing is doesn't much matter; whether it's too little time, money, friendship, food - it all contributes to experience a "scarcity mentality". And this has benefits. People who experience a sense of scarcity are good at managing their short-term problems. Poor people have an incredible ability - in the short term - to make ends meet, the same way that overworked CEOs can power through to close a deal. Despite all this, the drawbacks of a "scarcity mentality" are greater than the benefits. Scarcity narrows your focus to your immediate lack, to the meeting that's starting in five minutes or the bills that need to be paid tomorrow. The long-term perspective goes out of the window. "Scarcity consumes you", Shafir explains. "You're less able to focus on other things that are also important to you." ... There's a key distinction though between people with busy lives and those living in poverty: You can't take a break from poverty.”

“Warum arbeiten wir heute härter als in den achtziger Jahren, obwohl wir reicher sind als je zuvor? Warum leben immer noch Millionen Menschen in Armut, obwohl wir reich genug sind, um der Armut ein für alle Mal ein Ende zu machen? Und warum hängen mehr als 60 Prozent unseres Einkommens davon ab, in welchem Land wir geboren wurden?”

“Im Kapitalismus wie im Kommunismus läuft alles (...) auf eine falsche Vorstellung hinaus, die wir vor vierzig Jahren beinahe überwunden hätten: auf den Trugschluss, ein Leben ohne Armut sei kein Recht, auf das alle Menschen Anspruch hätten, sondern ein Privileg, für das man arbeiten müsse.”

“Schließlich verdanken wir nur einen Bruchteil unseres Wohlstands unseren eigenen Anstrengungen. Wir, die wir im Land des Überflusses leben, sind reich dank der Institutionen, des Wissens und des sozialen Kapitals, das unsere Vorfahren angehäuft haben. Dieser Reichtum gehört uns allen. Und ein Grundeinkommen wird uns allen erlauben, daran teilzuhaben.”

“Belief in humankind's sinful nature also provides a tidy explanation for the existence of evil. When confronted with hatred or selfishness, you can tell yourself, 'Oh, well, that's just human nature.' But if you believe that people are essentially good, you have to question why evil exists at all. It implies that engagement and resistance are worthwhile, and it imposes an obligation to act.”

“In the end, it's not the market or technology that decides what has real value, but society. If we want this century to be one in which all of us get richer, then we'll need to free ourselves of the dogma that all work is meaningful. And, while we're at it, let's also get rid of the fallacy that a higher salary is automatically a reflection of societal value.”

“Selbst wenn es zehn Bewerber für jeden Arbeitsplatz gibt, wird das Problem nicht in der Nachfrage, sondern im Angebot gesucht - also bei den Arbeitslosen, die nicht in der Lage sind, ihre "Beschäftigungsfähigkeit" zu entwickeln, oder sich einfach nicht ausreichend bemühen.”

“I want to share three warnings. First, to stand up for human goodness is to stand up against a hydra–that mythological seven-headed monster that grew back two heads for every one Hercules lopped off. Cynicism works a lot like that. For every misanthropic argument you deflate, two more will pop up in its place. Veneer theory is a zombie that just keeps coming back. Second, to stand up for human goodness is to take a stand against the powers that be. For the powerful, a hopeful view of human nature is downright threatening. Subversive. Seditious. It implies that we’re not selfish beasts that need to be reined in, restrained and regulated. It implies that we need a different kind of leadership. A company with intrinsically motivated employees has no need of managers; a democracy with engaged citizens has no need of career politicians. Third, to stand up for human goodness means weathering a storm of ridicule. You’ll be called naive. Obtuse. Any weakness in your reasoning will be mercilessly exposed. Basically, it’s easier to be a cynic. The pessimistic professor who preaches the doctrine of human depravity can predict anything he wants, for if his prophecies don’t come true now, just wait: failure could always be just around the corner, or else his voice of reason has prevented the worst. The prophets of doom sound oh so profound, whatever they spout. The reasons for hope, by contrast, are always provisional. Nothing has gone wrong–yet. You haven’t been cheated–yet. An idealist can be right her whole life and still be dismissed as naive. This book is intended to change that. Because what seems unreasonable, unrealistic and impossible today can turn out to be inevitable tomorrow. The time has come for a new view of human nature. It’s time for a new realism. It’s time for a new view of humankind.”

“In a weird way, to believe in our own sinful nature is comforting. It provides a kind of absolution. Because if most people are bad, then engagement and resistance aren't worth the effort. [...] When confronted with hatred or selfishness, you can tell yourself, 'Oh, well, that's just human nature.' But if you believe that people are essentially good, you have to question why evil exists at all. It implies that engagement and resistance are worthwhile, and it imposes an obligation to act.”

“Der Bankmanager, der ohne Rücksicht auf Verluste Hypotheken und Derivate unters Volk bringt, um sich einen Millionenbonus zu sichern, trägt mehr zum BIP bei als eine Schule voller Lehrer oder eine Fabrik voller Automechaniker. Wir leben in einer Welt, in der die Grundregel anscheinend lautet, dass wir umso weniger zum BIP beitragen, je wichtiger unsere Tätigkeit für die Gesellschaft ist, etwa wenn wir reinigen, pflegen, unterrichten.”

“Wenn wir von Effizienz und Produktivität besessen sind, ist es schwierig, den wahren Wert der Bildung und der Gesundheitspflege zu erkennen. Daher sehen viele Politiker und Steuerzahler nur die Kosten. Sie begreifen nicht, dass ein Land umso mehr für Lehrer und Ärzte ausgeben sollte, je reicher es wird.”

“Our standard of progress was conceived for a different era with different problems. Our statistics no longer capture the shape of our economy. And this has consequences. Every era needs its own figures. In the eighteenth century, they concerned the size of the harvest. In the nineteenth century, the radius of the rail network, the number of factories, and the volume of coal mining. And in the twentieth century, industrial mass production within the boundaries of the nation-state. But today it's no longer possible to express our prosperity in simple dollars, pounds, or euros. From healthcare to education, from journalism to finance, we're all still fixated on 'efficiency' and 'gains,' as though society were nothing but one big production line. But it's precisely in a service-based economy that simple quantitative targets fail... It's time for a new set of figures.”

“Rousseau already observed that this form of government is more accurately an ‘elective aristocracy’ because in practice the people are not in power at all. Instead we’re allowed to decide who holds power over us. It’s also important to realise this model was originally designed to exclude society’s rank and file. Take the American Constitution: historians agree it ‘was intrinsically an aristocratic document designed to check the democratic tendencies of the period’. It was never the American Founding Fathers’ intention for the general populace to play an active role in politics. Even now, though any citizen can run for public office, it’s tough to win an election without access to an aristocratic network of donors and lobbyists. It’s not surprising that American ‘democracy’ exhibits dynastic tendencies—think of the Kennedys, the Clintons, the Bushes. Time and again we hope for better leaders, but all too often those hopes are dashed. The reason, says Professor Keltner, is that power causes people to lose the kindness and modesty that got them elected, or they never possessed those sterling qualities in the first place. In a hierarchically organised society, the Machiavellis are one step ahead. They have the ultimate secret weapon to defeat their competition. They’re shameless.”

“True progress begins with something no knowledge economy can produce: wisdom about what it means to live well. We have to do what great thinkers like John Stuart Mill, Bertrand Russell, and John Maynard Keynes were already advocating 100 years ago: to “value ends above means and prefer the good to the useful.” We have to direct our minds to the future. To stop consuming our own discontent through polls and the relentlessly bad news media. To consider alternatives and form new collectives. To transcend this confining zeitgeist and recognize our shared idealism.”

“Simon Kuznets warnte bereits vor achtzig Jahren: "Aus einer Messung des Nationaleinkommens kann kaum auf das Wohlergehen eines Landes geschlossen werden. (...) Wir müssen den Unterschied zwischen Quantität und Qualität des Wachstums, zwischen Kosten und Erträgen und zwischen kurz- und langfristigen Entwicklungen im Auge behalten. (...) Die Wachstumsziele, die wir uns stecken, sollten die Frage beantworten, von welchem Wachstum wir mehr wollen und wozu.”