“I'm not so sure that I am a reductionist in the strict type-identity sense. The issues here are messy. But I certainly a reductionist in the more general sense which is opposed to eliminativism and dualism.” IssuesIdentityTypeStrictMessyDualism Author:David Papineau
“On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsTryingWould BeViewsBrainIssuesAppealsHopelessMechanismIntrospectionOrthodoxy Author:David Papineau
“The 'phenomenal concept' issue is rather different, I think. Here the question is whether there are concepts of experiences that are made available to subjects solely in virtue of their having had those experiences themselves. Is there a way of thinking about seeing something red, say, that you get from having had those experiences, and so isn't available to a blind person?” ThinkingWayPersonsMadeDifferentVirtueIssuesSeeingSubjectsConceptsRedBlindAvailableWay Of ThinkingPhenomenalBlind Person Author:David Papineau
“After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so I don't think that introspection is powerful enough to resolve the specific issue about how many colours you can see.” ThinkingEnoughPowerfulIssuesConceptsColourResolveIntrospectionPhenomenalSiding Author:David Papineau
“I think that there are non-physical laws all right: genuine (if not strict) laws written in the language of biology, economics, and so on. But I don't regard that as a contentious issue. Even reductionists about chemistry will think that there are special chemical laws whose formulation makes essential use of chemical terminology.” IfsThinkingUseLawLanguageIssuesWrittenSpecialEssentialsEconomicsRegardGenuineBiologyChemistryChemicalsStrictTerminologyContentiousStrict Laws Author:David Papineau
