“In truth a clear-headed physicalist shouldn't be thinking any of these dualist thoughts. If pains are one and the same as C-fibres firing, then there really isn't any possibility of having 'one' without the 'other'. Once you properly appreciates physicalism, this dissociation should cease to appear possible - C-fibres with pains should strike you as no more possible than squares without rectangles.” IfsThinkingShouldPainClearPossibilityAppreciateStrikesCeaseSquaresDissociationFiringRectangles Author:David Papineau
“I don't think that we are capable of anything like this many possible colour responses. Instead I argue that the perception of colour differences between two surfaces viewed side-by-side is a gestalt phenomenon.” ThinkingTwoSidesDifferencesPerceptionCapableResponseSurfaceArguingColourPhenomenonGestalt Author:David Papineau
“I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can be conceptualized, but I don't think he goes so far as to deny that it doesn't involve different responses to all the discriminable surfaces.” ThinkingWantDifferentShowsViewsPerceptionResponseDenySurfaceRadicalColour Author:David Papineau
“On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsTryingWould BeViewsBrainIssuesAppealsHopelessMechanismIntrospectionOrthodoxy Author:David Papineau
“The 'phenomenal concept' issue is rather different, I think. Here the question is whether there are concepts of experiences that are made available to subjects solely in virtue of their having had those experiences themselves. Is there a way of thinking about seeing something red, say, that you get from having had those experiences, and so isn't available to a blind person?” ThinkingWayPersonsMadeDifferentVirtueIssuesSeeingSubjectsConceptsRedBlindAvailableWay Of ThinkingPhenomenalBlind Person Author:David Papineau
“After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so I don't think that introspection is powerful enough to resolve the specific issue about how many colours you can see.” ThinkingEnoughPowerfulIssuesConceptsColourResolveIntrospectionPhenomenalSiding Author:David Papineau
“I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms as well. We need to figure out what information is present in the mechanisms that constitute conscious colour perception.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsWellsBrainFiguresInformationPerceptionConsciousColourMechanismIntrospection Author:David Papineau
“The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind. How rich are the contents of visual perception? Does vision only tell us about shapes and colours, or does it also represent higher categories like lemon or umbrella?” ThinkingMindDoeHelpingUseCommonVisionRichHigherShapesProvePerceptionContemporaryDataThemeVisualsColourResolveCategoriesLemonsUmbrellaVisual Perception Author:David Papineau
“I rather incline towards 'conceptualism', in line with my view of colour perception - I don't think that we can represent objects and properties for which we have no concepts, not even in perceptual experience. In this sense I differ from those who defend 'non-conceptual content' like Michael Tye and Chris Peacocke.” ThinkingLinesViewsObjectsPerceptionConceptsPropertyColourIncline Author:David Papineau
“A certain kind of methodologically-minded philosopher of science is quick to read off metaphysical conclusions from features of scientific practice. Chemists don't derive their laws from fundamental physics, so reductive physicalism must be false. Biologists refer to natural numbers in some of their explanations, so numbers must exist. I think that this kind of thing makes for bad philosophy.” ThinkingKindPhilosophyLawCertainNaturalNumbersPracticeFundamentalsPhilosopherPhysicsConclusionFeaturesExplanationMetaphysicalBiologistChemist Author:David Papineau
“I think that there are non-physical laws all right: genuine (if not strict) laws written in the language of biology, economics, and so on. But I don't regard that as a contentious issue. Even reductionists about chemistry will think that there are special chemical laws whose formulation makes essential use of chemical terminology.” IfsThinkingUseLawLanguageIssuesWrittenSpecialEssentialsEconomicsRegardGenuineBiologyChemistryChemicalsStrictTerminologyContentiousStrict Laws Author:David Papineau
