“Kripke says that physicalists like me can't explain the 'apparent contingency' of mind-brain identities. He maintains that, if I really believed that pains are C-fibres, then I ought no longer to have any room for the thought that 'they' might come apart. His argument is that, since pains aren't identified via some contingent description, but in terms of how they feel, I have no good way of constructing a possible world, so to speak, where C-fibres are present yet pains absent.” IfsWorldWayFeelsMindMightPainSpeakTermRoomsBrainIdentityOughtArgumentLike MeDescriptionAbsentGood WayContingency Author:David Papineau
“I say that there is nothing deficient about our current theoretical grasp of mind-brain identities. The problem is only that they are counter-intuitive.” MindProblemBrainIdentityCurrentsIntuitiveTheoretical Author:David Papineau
“Of course, there remains the question of why we should find mind-brain identities so persistently counter-intuitive, if they are true. But this is a simple psychological question, and there are a number of plausible explanations. Indeed this is a topic that is quite extensively discussed outside philosophy, by developmental psychologists and theorists of religion among others, under the heading of 'intuitive dualism'. It is rather shocking that so few of the many philosophers working on 'the explanatory gap' are familiar with this empirical literature.” IfsShouldMindPhilosophyCoursesLiteratureSimpleNumbersBrainIdentityRemainsPhilosopherFamiliarPsychologicalExplanationGapsTopicsShockingIntuitivePsychologistHeadingsPlausibleTheoristsDualismDevelopmental Author:David Papineau
“There is a brain mechanism that works to identify colour differences directly, without first identifying the absolute colour of each surface. So on my view there is no reason to suppose anything like ten million colour responses to surface viewed singly.” FirstsReasonDifferencesViewsBrainMillionsTenAbsolutesResponseSurfaceColourNo ReasonMechanismIdentifying Author:David Papineau
“On the methodological issue, I think that would be hopeless to try to adjudicate between my view and orthodoxy by appeal to phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsTryingWould BeViewsBrainIssuesAppealsHopelessMechanismIntrospectionOrthodoxy Author:David Papineau
“I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms as well. We need to figure out what information is present in the mechanisms that constitute conscious colour perception.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsWellsBrainFiguresInformationPerceptionConsciousColourMechanismIntrospection Author:David Papineau
“Again, when we view a scene fleetingly, do we consciously see all the details even though we don't retain them, or do we not see them in the first place? Neurological information is crucial to deciding these questions. After all, they are so interesting precisely because unaided introspection cannot resolve them. Rather we need to know what is going on in the brain activities that constitute visual awareness.” KnowsNeedsFirstsInterestingViewsBrainAwarenessInformationSceneActivityDetailsVisualsResolveCrucialIntrospection Author:David Papineau
