“If there is such a simple argument for physicalism, how come everybody hasn't always been a physicalist? That's a good question, and there is a good answer. The 'causal completeness of physics' wasn't widely accepted until recently.” IfsSimpleAnswersArgumentAcceptedPhysicsCompletenessGood Questions Author:David Papineau
“Kripke says that physicalists like me can't explain the 'apparent contingency' of mind-brain identities. He maintains that, if I really believed that pains are C-fibres, then I ought no longer to have any room for the thought that 'they' might come apart. His argument is that, since pains aren't identified via some contingent description, but in terms of how they feel, I have no good way of constructing a possible world, so to speak, where C-fibres are present yet pains absent.” IfsWorldWayFeelsMindMightPainSpeakTermRoomsBrainIdentityOughtArgumentLike MeDescriptionAbsentGood WayContingency Author:David Papineau
“In truth a clear-headed physicalist shouldn't be thinking any of these dualist thoughts. If pains are one and the same as C-fibres firing, then there really isn't any possibility of having 'one' without the 'other'. Once you properly appreciates physicalism, this dissociation should cease to appear possible - C-fibres with pains should strike you as no more possible than squares without rectangles.” IfsThinkingShouldPainClearPossibilityAppreciateStrikesCeaseSquaresDissociationFiringRectangles Author:David Papineau
“Of course, there remains the question of why we should find mind-brain identities so persistently counter-intuitive, if they are true. But this is a simple psychological question, and there are a number of plausible explanations. Indeed this is a topic that is quite extensively discussed outside philosophy, by developmental psychologists and theorists of religion among others, under the heading of 'intuitive dualism'. It is rather shocking that so few of the many philosophers working on 'the explanatory gap' are familiar with this empirical literature.” IfsShouldMindPhilosophyCoursesLiteratureSimpleNumbersBrainIdentityRemainsPhilosopherFamiliarPsychologicalExplanationGapsTopicsShockingIntuitivePsychologistHeadingsPlausibleTheoristsDualismDevelopmental Author:David Papineau
“If neuroscientific research shows that those mechanisms only contain comparative information about colour differences, and have 'thrown away' more fine-grained information about the absolute colours of single surfaces, then that would support my position, in a way that just introspecting our colour experiences can't.” IfsWayShowsDifferencesSupportInformationPositionFineResearchAbsolutesSurfaceColourThrownMechanismScientific Research Author:David Papineau
“Schrödinger's cat has a 50% quantum chance of coming out of the box alive and a 50% quantum chance of coming out dead. If you got in the box with it, the same would apply to you. So you really don't want to do that.” IfsWantChanceAliveCatBoxesComing OutQuantum Author:David Papineau
“Even if no learning to speak of was involved in locking my mental term onto doorknobs, it is odd to say that therefore my possession of a doorknob concept is innate, just as it is odd to say that my head-injury-caused singing is innate.” IfsSpeakTermInvolvedSingingConceptsPossessionOddInjuryInnateHead Injuries Author:David Papineau
“I think that there are non-physical laws all right: genuine (if not strict) laws written in the language of biology, economics, and so on. But I don't regard that as a contentious issue. Even reductionists about chemistry will think that there are special chemical laws whose formulation makes essential use of chemical terminology.” IfsThinkingUseLawLanguageIssuesWrittenSpecialEssentialsEconomicsRegardGenuineBiologyChemistryChemicalsStrictTerminologyContentiousStrict Laws Author:David Papineau
