“The orthodox view of colour experience assumes that, when we see a colour difference between two surfaces viewed side-by-side, this is because we have different responses to each of the two surfaces viewed singly. Since we can detect colour differences between something like ten million different surfaces, this implies that we are capable of ten million colour responses to surfaces viewed singly.” TwoDifferentSidesDifferencesViewsMillionsTenCapableAssumingResponseSurfaceColourOrthodox Author:David Papineau
“I don't think that we are capable of anything like this many possible colour responses. Instead I argue that the perception of colour differences between two surfaces viewed side-by-side is a gestalt phenomenon.” ThinkingTwoSidesDifferencesPerceptionCapableResponseSurfaceArguingColourPhenomenonGestalt Author:David Papineau
“There is a brain mechanism that works to identify colour differences directly, without first identifying the absolute colour of each surface. So on my view there is no reason to suppose anything like ten million colour responses to surface viewed singly.” FirstsReasonDifferencesViewsBrainMillionsTenAbsolutesResponseSurfaceColourNo ReasonMechanismIdentifying Author:David Papineau
“I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can be conceptualized, but I don't think he goes so far as to deny that it doesn't involve different responses to all the discriminable surfaces.” ThinkingWantDifferentShowsViewsPerceptionResponseDenySurfaceRadicalColour Author:David Papineau
“After all, in supporting phenomenal concepts I am in a sense siding with introspection against the more behaviourist Wittgensteinians. But even so I don't think that introspection is powerful enough to resolve the specific issue about how many colours you can see.” ThinkingEnoughPowerfulIssuesConceptsColourResolveIntrospectionPhenomenalSiding Author:David Papineau
“I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms as well. We need to figure out what information is present in the mechanisms that constitute conscious colour perception.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsWellsBrainFiguresInformationPerceptionConsciousColourMechanismIntrospection Author:David Papineau
“If neuroscientific research shows that those mechanisms only contain comparative information about colour differences, and have 'thrown away' more fine-grained information about the absolute colours of single surfaces, then that would support my position, in a way that just introspecting our colour experiences can't.” IfsWayShowsDifferencesSupportInformationPositionFineResearchAbsolutesSurfaceColourThrownMechanismScientific Research Author:David Papineau
“The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind. How rich are the contents of visual perception? Does vision only tell us about shapes and colours, or does it also represent higher categories like lemon or umbrella?” ThinkingMindDoeHelpingUseCommonVisionRichHigherShapesProvePerceptionContemporaryDataThemeVisualsColourResolveCategoriesLemonsUmbrellaVisual Perception Author:David Papineau
“I rather incline towards 'conceptualism', in line with my view of colour perception - I don't think that we can represent objects and properties for which we have no concepts, not even in perceptual experience. In this sense I differ from those who defend 'non-conceptual content' like Michael Tye and Chris Peacocke.” ThinkingLinesViewsObjectsPerceptionConceptsPropertyColourIncline Author:David Papineau
