“I don't think that we are capable of anything like this many possible colour responses. Instead I argue that the perception of colour differences between two surfaces viewed side-by-side is a gestalt phenomenon.” ThinkingTwoSidesDifferencesPerceptionCapableResponseSurfaceArguingColourPhenomenonGestalt Author:David Papineau
“I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can be conceptualized, but I don't think he goes so far as to deny that it doesn't involve different responses to all the discriminable surfaces.” ThinkingWantDifferentShowsViewsPerceptionResponseDenySurfaceRadicalColour Author:David Papineau
“I don't think that we can figure out what is going on in conscious colour perception just by phenomenological introspection. We need to know about brain mechanisms as well. We need to figure out what information is present in the mechanisms that constitute conscious colour perception.” ThinkingKnowsNeedsWellsBrainFiguresInformationPerceptionConsciousColourMechanismIntrospection Author:David Papineau
“The use of neuroscientific data to help resolve phenomenological questions is proving a common theme in much contemporary thinking about the mind. How rich are the contents of visual perception? Does vision only tell us about shapes and colours, or does it also represent higher categories like lemon or umbrella?” ThinkingMindDoeHelpingUseCommonVisionRichHigherShapesProvePerceptionContemporaryDataThemeVisualsColourResolveCategoriesLemonsUmbrellaVisual Perception Author:David Papineau
“I rather incline towards 'conceptualism', in line with my view of colour perception - I don't think that we can represent objects and properties for which we have no concepts, not even in perceptual experience. In this sense I differ from those who defend 'non-conceptual content' like Michael Tye and Chris Peacocke.” ThinkingLinesViewsObjectsPerceptionConceptsPropertyColourIncline Author:David Papineau
