“The orthodox view of colour experience assumes that, when we see a colour difference between two surfaces viewed side-by-side, this is because we have different responses to each of the two surfaces viewed singly. Since we can detect colour differences between something like ten million different surfaces, this implies that we are capable of ten million colour responses to surfaces viewed singly.” TwoDifferentSidesDifferencesViewsMillionsTenCapableAssumingResponseSurfaceColourOrthodox Author:David Papineau
“I think my view is rather more radical than Pete Mandik's. Both of us want to show that colour perception doesn't transcend what can be conceptualized, but I don't think he goes so far as to deny that it doesn't involve different responses to all the discriminable surfaces.” ThinkingWantDifferentShowsViewsPerceptionResponseDenySurfaceRadicalColour Author:David Papineau
“The 'phenomenal concept' issue is rather different, I think. Here the question is whether there are concepts of experiences that are made available to subjects solely in virtue of their having had those experiences themselves. Is there a way of thinking about seeing something red, say, that you get from having had those experiences, and so isn't available to a blind person?” ThinkingWayPersonsMadeDifferentVirtueIssuesSeeingSubjectsConceptsRedBlindAvailableWay Of ThinkingPhenomenalBlind Person Author:David Papineau
“I don't have much use for the concept of innateness. The everyday concept incorporates a number of different notions that can come apart in in many ways, and as a result encourages a range of dangerously fallacious inferences.” WayDifferentUseResultsNumbersConceptsNotionEverydayRangeInference Author:David Papineau
