Quotessence
Home / Authors / Bertrand Russell
Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell Quotes

Philosopher

Filter quotes by topic

Famous Bertrand Russell Quotes

“I have been accused of a habit of changing my opinions. I am not myself in any degree ashamed of having changed my opinions. What physicist who was already active in 1900 would dream of boasting that his opinions had not changed during the last half century? In science men change their opinions when new knowledge becomes available; but philosophy in the minds of many is assimilated rather to theology than to science. The kind of philosophy that I value and have endeavoured to pursue is scientific, in the sense that there is some definite knowledge to be obtained and that new discoveries can make the admission of former error inevitable to any candid mind. For what I have said, whether early or late, I do not claim the kind of truth which theologians claim for their creeds. I claim only, at best, that the opinion expressed was a sensible one to hold at the time when it was expressed. I should be much surprised if subsequent research did not show that it needed to be modified. I hope, therefore, that whoever uses this dictionary will not suppose the remarks which it quotes to be intended as pontifical pronouncements, but only as the best I could do at the time towards the promotion of clear and accurate thinking. Clarity, above all, has been my aim.”

“When you come to look into this argument from design, it is a most astonishing thing that people can believe that this world, with all the things that are in it, with all its defects, should be the best that omnipotence and omniscience have been able to produce in millions of years. I really cannot believe it. Do you think that, if you were granted omnipotence and omniscience and millions of years in which to perfect your world, you could produce nothing better than the Ku Klux Klan or the Fascists? Moreover, if you accept the ordinary laws of science, you have to suppose that human life and life in general on this planet will die out in due course: it is a stage in the decay of the solar system; at a certain stage of decay you get the sort of conditions of temperature and so forth which are suitable to protoplasm, and there is life for a short time in the life of the whole solar system. You see in the moon the sort of thing to which the earth is tending -- something dead, cold, and lifeless.”

“If the ordinary wage-earner worked four hours a day, there would be enough for everybody and no unemployment -- assuming a certain very moderate amount of sensible organization. This idea shocks the well-to-do, because they are convinced that the poor would not know how to use so much leisure. In America men often work long hours even when they are well off; such men, naturally, are indignant at the idea of leisure for wage-earners, except as the grim punishment of unemployment; in fact, they dislike leisure even for their sons.”

“The value of philosophy is, in fact, to be sought largely in its very uncertainty. The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his deliberate reason. To such a man the world tends to become definite, finite, obvious; common objects rouse no questions, and unfamiliar possibilities are contemptuously rejected. As soon as we begin to philosophize, on the contrary, we find, as we saw in our opening chapters, that even the most everyday things lead to problems to which only very incomplete answers can be given….”

“How, in such an alien and inhuman world, can so powerless a creature as man preserve his aspirations untarnished? A strange mystery it is that nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking mother. In spite of death, the mark and seal of the parental control, man is yet free, during his brief years, to examine, to criticize, to know, and in imagination to create. To him alone, in the world with which he is aquainted, this freedom belongs; and in this lies his superiority to the resistless forces that control his outward life.”

“The romantic movement, in art, in literature, and in politics, is bond up with this subjective way of judging men, not as members of a community, but as aesthetically delightful objects of contemplation. Tigers are more beautiful than sheep, but we prefer them behind bars. The typical romantic removes the bars and enjoys the magnificent leaps with which the tiger annihilates the sheep. He exhorts men to imagine themselves tigers, and when he succeeds the results are not wholly pleasant.”

“Однако существует довод и более общего характера против слепого преклонения перед греками или кем бы то ни было еще. Правильное отношение к изучению того или иного философа состоит не в том, чтобы почитать или презирать его, но прежде всего в некоторого рода предрасположенности, дающей возможность понять, что именно склоняет к тому, чтобы верить в его теории, и только потом следует оживлять критическое отношение, которое должно напоминать, насколько это возможно, состояние ума той личности, которая отбрасывает мнения, отстаиваемые ею прежде. Презрение мешает первой части этого процесса, преклонение – второй. Следует при этом учитывать две вещи: надо помнить, что человек, чьи взгляды и теории заслуживают изучения, должен, по-видимому, обладать определенным умом, но надо также иметь в виду, что ни один человек не достигал, вероятно, полной и окончательной истины по какому бы то ни было вопросу. Когда умный человек выражает совершенно абсурдный с нашей точки зрения взгляд, мы не должны пытаться доказывать, что этот взгляд тем не менее является правильным, но нам следует попытаться понять, каким образом этот взгляд когда-то казался правильным. Это упражнение исторического и психологического воображения одновременно и расширяет сферу нашего мышления, и помогает нам понять, насколько глупыми многие из лелеемых нами предрассудков покажутся веку, обладающему другим складом ума.”

“Это не вина психологии романтиков, это их стандарт ценностей. Они восхищаются сильными страстями, безразлично какого рода и каковы бы ни были их социальные последствия. Романтическая любовь, особенно когда она несчастлива, достаточно сильна, чтобы заслужить их одобрение, но большинство сильнейших страстей разрушительно: ненависть, негодование и ревность, раскаяние и отчаяние, поруганная гордость и ярость несправедливо притесняемого, воинственный пыл и презрение к рабам и трусам. Следовательно, тип человека, поддерживаемый романтизмом, особенно в его байроновском варианте, – это склонный к насилию и антисоциальный, анархический бунтарь или побеждающий деспот. Причины того, что это мировоззрение обладает притягательной силой, лежат очень глубоко в природе человека и условиях его существования. Из чувства самосохранения человек стал стадным существом, но инстинктивно он остается в очень большой степени одиночкой; следовательно, необходимы религия и мораль, чтобы подкрепить этот инстинкт. Но привычка воздерживаться от удовольствий в настоящем ради преимуществ в будущем утомительна, и когда возбуждаются страсти, трудно держать себя в благоразумных рамках общественного поведения. Те, кто в такие моменты отбрасывает их, приобретают новую энергию и ощущение силы от прекращения внутреннего конфликта, и, хотя в конце концов они могут попасть в беду, они наслаждаются чувством божественной экзальтации, которое, хотя известно великим мистикам, никогда не может быть испытано теми, чье поведение не выходит за рамки прозаической добродетели. Индивидуалистическая сторона их природы утверждает себя, но, если сохраняется интеллект, это утверждение должно облекать себя в миф. Мистик пребывает наедине с Богом и, созерцая бесконечное, чувствует себя свободным от обязанностей по отношению к своему ближнему.”

“Бунт индивидуалистических инстинктов против социальных уз является ключом к пониманию философии, политики и чувств – не только того, что обычно называется движением романтизма, но и его последователей вплоть до наших дней. Философия под влиянием немецкого идеализма стала солипсистской, и самоусовершенствование было провозглашено основополагающим принципом этики. Что касается чувства, то должен был существовать неприятный компромисс между стремлением к изоляции и необходимостью удовлетворения страсти и экономических потребностей. В рассказе Д. Г. Лоуренса «Человек, который любил острова» герой постепенно все в большей степени пренебрегает таким компромиссом и в конце концов умирает от голода и холода, но наслаждаясь полной изоляцией. Однако такой последовательности не достигли писатели, которые превозносят одиночество. Отшельник не пользуется удобствами цивилизованной жизни, и человек, который хочет писать книги или создавать произведения искусства, должен принять помощь других, для того чтобы поддержать свое существование в то время, когда он работает. Для того чтобы продолжать чувствовать себя в одиночестве, он должен быть в состоянии предотвратить тех, кто служит ему, от покушения на его Я, что лучше всего достигается, если они являются рабами. Страстная любовь, однако, более сложное дело. Поскольку страстные любовники рассматриваются как люди, которые восстали против социальных оков, ими восхищаются. Но в реальной жизни отношения любви сами быстро становятся социальными оковами и партнера по любви начинают ненавидеть, и все более неистово, если любовь достаточно сильна, чтобы сделать узы такими, что их трудно разорвать. Следовательно, любовь начинают представлять как борьбу, в которой каждый стремится уничтожить другого, проникая сквозь защитительные барьеры его или ее Я. Эта точка зрения становится обычной в произведениях Стриндберга и еще больше Д. Г. Лоуренса.”

“Движение романтизма, в сущности, ставило целью освобождение человеческой личности от пут общественных условностей и общественной морали. В частности, эти путы были лишь бесполезным препятствием к желательным формам деятельности, так как каждая древняя община выработала правила поведения, относительно которых нечего сказать, кроме того, что они традиционны. Но эгоистические страсти, однажды освобожденные, нелегко снова подчинить интересам общества. Христианство имело определенный успех в усмирении «Я». Но экономические, политические и интеллектуальные причины стимулировали мятеж против церкви, а движение романтизма перенесло мятеж в сферу морали. Поощрения нового, ничем не ограниченного «Я» ясно делали общественную кооперацию невозможной и поставили его последователей перед альтернативой анархии или деспотизма. Эгоизм поначалу заставлял людей ожидать от других отеческой нежности. Но, когда они открыли с негодованием, что другие имеют свое собственное Я, разочарованное желание нежности обратилось в ненависть и насилие. Человек – не одиночное животное, и, поскольку существует общественная жизнь, самоутверждение не может быть высшим принципом этики.”

“Со своей стороны, я предпочитаю онтологическое доказательство [существования Бога], космологическое доказательство и остальной старый запас аргументов той сентиментальной нелогичности, которая берет начало от Руссо. Старые доказательства были по крайней мере честными; если они правильные, то они доказывали свою точку зрения, если они неправильные, то для любой критики доступно доказать это. Но новая теология сердца отказывается от доказательства; она не может быть отвергнута, потому что она не претендует на доказательство своей точки зрения. В конечном счете единственным основанием для ее принятия оказывается то, что она позволяет нам предаваться приятным грезам. Это не заслуживающая уважения причина, и, если бы я выбирал между Фомой Аквинским и Руссо, я выбрал бы Фому Аквинского.”

“Следует признать, что имеется определенный тип христианской этики, к которому осуждающая критика Ницше может быть применена справедливо. Паскаль и Достоевский, которых он сам приводит в качестве примера, – оба имеют что-то жалкое в своей добродетели. Паскаль принес в жертву своему Богу великолепный математический ум, тем самым приписывая Богу жестокость, которая является космическим расширением болезненных душевных мук самого Паскаля. Достоевский не желал иметь ничего общего с «личной гордостью»; он согрешил бы, чтобы покаяться и испытать наслаждение исповеди. Я не стану обсуждать вопрос, насколько в таких помрачениях ума следует обвинять христианство, но я согласен с Ницше, считая прострацию Достоевского презренной. Я должен согласиться и с тем, что прямота и гордость и даже некоторое самоутверждение являются элементами самого лучшего характера. Нельзя восхищаться добродетелью, в основе которой лежит страх.”

“In reading any important philosopher, but most of all in reading Aristotle, it is necessary to study him in two ways; with reference to his predecessors, and with reference to his successors. In the former aspect, Aristotle's merits are enormous; in the latter, his demerits are equally enormous. For his demerits, however, his successors are more responsible than he is. He came at the end of the creative period of Greek thought, and after his death it was two thousand years before the world produced any philosopher who would be regarded as approximately his equal. Towards the end of this long period his authority had become almost as unquestioned as the Church, and in science, as well as in philosophy, had become a serious obstacle to progress. Ever since the beginning of the seventeenth century, almost every serious intellectual advance had to begin with an attack on some Aristotelian doctrine; in logic, this is still true at the present day. But it would have been at least as disastrous if any of his predecessors (except perhaps Democritus) had acquired equal authority.”

“The world of being is unchangeable, rigid, exact, delightful to the mathematician, the logician, the builder of metaphysical systems, and all who love perfection more than life. The world of existence is fleeting, vague, without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement, but it contains all thoughts and feelings, all the data of sense, and all physical objects, everything that can do either good or harm, everything that makes any difference to the value of life and the world. According to our temperaments, we shall prefer the contemplation of the one or of the other.”

“Ever since Plato most philosophers have considered it part of their business to produce ‘proofs’ of immortality and the existence of God. They have found fault with the proofs of their predecessors — Saint Thomas rejected Saint Anselm's proofs, and Kant rejected Descartes' — but they have supplied new ones of their own. In order to make their proofs seem valid, they have had to falsify logic, to make mathematics mystical, and to pretend that deepseated prejudices were heaven-sent intuitions.”

“Pure mathematics consists entirely of assertions to the effect that, if such and such a proposition is true of anything, then such and such another proposition is true of that thing. It is essential not to discuss whether the first proposition is really true, and not to mention what the anything is, of which it is supposed to be true. [...] Thus mathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. People who have been puzzled by the beginnings of mathematics will, I hope, find comfort in this definition, and will probably agree that it is accurate.”

“There is a widespread philosophical tendency towards the view which tells us that Man is the measure of all things, that truth is man-made, that space and time and the world of universals are properties of the mind, and that, if there be anything not created by the mind, it is unknowable and of no account for us. This view, if our previous discussions were correct, is untrue; but in addition to being untrue, it has the effect of robbing philosophic contemplation of all that gives it value, since it fetters contemplation to Self. What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-Self, but a set of prejudices, habits, and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond. The man who finds pleasure in such a theory of knowledge is like a man who never leaves the domestic circle for fear his word might not be law.”

“The deeply irrational attitude of each sex toward women may be seen in novels, particularly in bad novels. In bad novels by men, there is the woman with whom the author is in love, who usually possesses every charm, but is somewhat helpless, and requires male protection; sometimes, however, like Shakespeare’s Cleopatra, she is an object of exasperated hatred, and is thought to be deeply and desperately wicked. In portraying the heroine, the male author does not write from observation, but merely objectifies his own emotions. In regard to his other female characters, he is more objective, and may even depend upon his notebook; but when he is in love, his passion makes a mist between him and the object of his devotion. Women novelists, also, have two kinds of women in their books. One is themselves, glamorous and kind, and object of lust to the wicked and of love to the good, sensitive, highsouled, and constantly misjudged. The other kind is represented by all other women, and is usually portrayed as petty, spiteful, cruel, and deceitful. It would seem that to judge women without bias is not easy either for men or for women.”

“The fact is you cannot be intelligent merely by choosing your opinions. The intelligent man is not the man who holds such-and-such views but the man who has sound reasons for what he believes and yet does not believe it dogmatically. And opinions held for sound reasons have less emotional unity than the opinions of dogmatists because reason is non-party, favouring now one side and now another. That is what people find so unpleasant about it.”

“It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely on the ground that he is in a minority, or rather — since we must not assume democracy — on the ground that the government does not agree with him. This is a desperate point of view, and it must be hoped that there is some way of escaping from it.”

“In Hume, Rationalism and scepticism existed peacefully side by side. Scepticism was for the study only, and was to be forgotten in the business of practical life. Moreover, practical life was to be governed, as far as possible, by those very methods of science which his scepticism impugned. Such a compromise was only possible for a man who was in equal parts a philosopher and a man of the world; there is also a flavour of aristocratic Toryism in the reservation of an esoteric unbelief for the initiated. The world at large refused to accept Hume’s doctrines in their entirety. His followers rejected his scepticism, while his German opponents emphasized it as the inevitable outcome of a merely scientific and rational outlook. Thus as the result of his teaching British philosophy became superficial, while German philosophy became anti-rational—in each case from fear of an unbearable Agnosticism. European thought has never recovered its previous whole-heartedness; among all the successors of Hume, sanity has meant superficiality, and profundity has meant some degree of madness. In the most recent discussions of the philosophy appropriate to quantum physics, the old debates raised by Hume are still proceeding.”

“Святий Кирило, поборник єдності, був людиною фанатично ревною. Він користався своїм становищем патріарха, аби розпалювати погроми в дуже великій єврейській колонії у Александрії. Найбільш уславився він самосудом над Гіпатією, видатною жінкою, що в ту добу святенництва держалась неоплатонічної філософії й присвятила свої таланти математиці. її «стягли з колісниці, здерли з неї весь одяг, затягли до церкви й нелюдськи замордували читець Петро та юрба знавіснілих безжальних фанатиків; м'ясо зішкрібали їй з кісток гострими скойками, а потім кинули тіло, яке ще корчилось, у вогонь. Справедливий хід слідства й покари був зупинений відповідними хабарами». Після цього філософи більш не баламутили Александрії.”

“While the dogmatist is harmful, the sceptic is useless ...; one is certain of knowing, the other of not knowing. What philosophy should dissipate is certainty, whether of knowledge or of ignorance. Knowledge is not so precise a concept as is commonly thought. Instead of saying 'I know this', we ought to say 'I more or less know something more or less like this'. ... Knowledge in practical affairs has not the certainty or the precision of arithmetic.”

“Descartes, the father of modern philosophy ... would never-so he assures us-have been led to construct his philosophy if he had had only one teacher, for then he would have believed what he had been told; but, finding that his professors disagreed with each other, he was forced to conclude that no existing doctrine was certain.”

“BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism We've associated that word philosophy with academic study that in its own way has gotten so far beyond the layman that if you read contemporary philosophy you've no clue, because it's almost become math. And it's odd that if you don't do that and you call yourself a philosopher that you always get 'homespun' attached to it.”

“Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions, since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind is also rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good.”

“Hegel's philosophy is so odd that one would not have expected him to be able to get sane men to accept it, but he did. He set it out with so much obscurity that people thought it must be profound. It can quite easily be expounded lucidly in words of one syllable, but then its absurdity becomes obvious.”

“We may say, in a broad way, that Greek philosophy down to Aristotle expresses the mentality appropriate to the City State; that Stoicism is appropriate to a cosmopolitan despotism; that stochastic philosophy is an intellectual expression of the Church as an organization; that philosophy since Descartes, or at any rate since Locke, tends to embody the prejudices of the commercial middle class; and that Marxism and Fascism are the philosophies appropriate to the modern industrial state.”

“Men who allow their love of power to give them a distorted view of the world are to be found in every asylum: one man will think he is the Governor of the Bank of England, another will think he is the King, and yet another will think he is God. Highly similar delusions, if expressed by educated men in obscure language, lead to professorships of philosophy; and if expressed by emotional men in eloquent language, lead to dictatorships.”

“With subjectivity in philosophy, anarchism in politics goes hand in hand. Already during Luther's lifetime, unwelcome and unacknowledged disciples had developed the doctrine of Anabaptism, which for a time dominated the city of Munster. The Anabaptists repudiated all law since they held that good men will be guided at every moment by the Holy Spirit, who can not be bound by formulas. From this premise they arrive at communism and sexual promiscuity; they were therefore exterminated after a heroic resistance.”

“The doctrine (of) maintaining that the language of daily life, with words used in their ordinary meanings, suffices for philosophy . . . I find myself totally unable to accept . . . . Because it makes almost inevitable the perpetuation amongst philosophers of the muddle-headedness they have taken over from common sense.”

“The philosophies that have been inspired by scientific technique are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything non-human as mere raw material. Ends are no longer considered; only the skillfulness of the process is valued. This also is a form of madness. It is, in our day, the most dangerous form, and the one against which a sane philosophy should provide an antidote”